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Abstract
Using a dataset of Chinese judicial opinions arising in over fifty cases, this paper analyses the
development and current implementation of shareholder derivative actions in the courts of the People’s
Republic of China (“PRC”), both before and after the derivative lawsuit was explicitly authorized in the
PRC’s 2006 Company Law effective January 1, 2006. In addition, we describe the very unique ecology of
enterprise organization and corporate governance in modern China, and critique the formal design of the
derivative action and offer reform suggestions.
We find the design of the Chinese derivative lawsuit to be, in some respects, innovative and
appropriate for Chinese circumstances. For instance, the statutory scheme permits “horizontal” claims
against controlling or oppressive shareholders in addition to “vertical” claims against orthodox insiders
and fiduciaries. At the same time, we find certain design flaws, including standing-based obstacles for
plaintiffs, a lack of clarity regarding demand, demand excuse and refusal, and an unnecessary distinction
regarding the required wrong underlying derivative actions directed at corporate fiduciaries, on one hand,
and others (such as controlling shareholders), on the other.
In implementation, we find extremely robust – even overly-aggressive – use of the mechanism by
both plaintiffs and deciding judges before and after its formal recognition in law. As in other applications
of the corporate law before the courts in China, this use of the derivative action seems to be entirely
limited to the closely-held form of corporation. The absence of application with respect to the widely-held,
joint stock, form of company is striking because the derivative lawsuit itself was included in the 2006
PRC Company Law revision precisely so as to give minority shareholders in such widely-held companies
a way to hold insiders and controlling shareholders accountable at law for rampant malfeasance.
In addition, we note the way in which some PRC courts are wary or uncomprehending of the
underlying corporate law doctrines for which the derivative action is a necessary vehicle, particularly the
duty of care.
A final updated and edited version of this paper will be published as “Pathway to Minority
Shareholder Protection: Derivative Actions in the People’s Republic of China” in D. Puchniak et al. (eds.),
The Derivative Action in Asia: A Comparative and Functional Approach (Cambridge University Press,
forthcoming Spring 2012).
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I.

Introduction

In October 2005, China’s national legislature passed a series of major amendments to the
original Company Law of 1994 permitting, among other things, the first form of derivative
lawsuit in modern Chinese history. 2 Effective from 2006, this innovation was designed to
improve China’s corporate governance system and provide a weapon against insider and
controlling shareholder abuse at China’s newly corporatized listed companies. The new
mechanism was also consistent with a broader formal shift in the Company Law towards a
greater emphasis on judicial power and the ex post remedies instead of ex ante supervision by
administrative agencies. The derivative lawsuit was introduced, however, into a politicaleconomic order, and an accompanying legal system, that is barely three decades old, with the
nation’s first Western-style corporate law not effective until 1995. Moreover, few of those who
draft, administer, or adjudicate on the basis of corporate legislation have any appreciable
business experience, the state at multiple levels remains a commanding presence as a regulator
and a corporate shareholder, and genuinely private large companies are rare.
In this chapter, we look at the past and present of shareholder derivative actions in the
PRC. Using a large set of cases (see Appendix I—Cases), 3 we trace the gradual introduction of
the derivative lawsuit into China’s legal system and its development after January 1, 2006. We
find the design of the 2006 Company Law derivative lawsuit in some respects innovative and
appropriate for Chinese circumstances—for instance, it includes parties other than standard
insiders and fiduciaries as defendants, and thus permits “horizontal” claims against controlling or
oppressive shareholders. At the same time, we find certain design flaws, including standingbased obstacles placed in the way of plaintiffs, lack of clarity regarding demand, demand excusal,
and refusal, and an unnecessary distinction regarding the required wrong underlying derivative
actions directed at corporate fiduciaries and “others.” We also find robust use of the derivative
lawsuit by plaintiffs and courts both before and after its formal recognition in law. However,
that use seems almost entirely limited to the closely-held form of corporation under PRC law, the
“limited liability company” (youxian zeren gongsi) (“LLC”), with derivative lawsuits involving
widely-held companies limited by shares (gufen youxian gongsi) (“CLS”) strikingly absent. That
1
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absence is particularly striking because the derivative lawsuit was included in the 2006 Company
Law precisely in order to give minority shareholders in such CLSs a way to hold insiders and
controlling shareholders accountable at law for rampant malfeasance.
II.

Economic and Legal Reform in the PRC and the Derivative Action
a. Introduction – the Derivative Lawsuit and Corporate Governance in the
Chinese Context

China’s corporate governance experts and legislative drafters have long viewed the
derivative lawsuit as a necessary part of that nation’s effective corporate governance system.
Yet in China the actual implementation of a derivative lawsuit mechanism has implications
going beyond mere corporate governance concerns. As we describe in more detail below, many
corporate entities in the PRC are dominated by insiders who have—or represent—significant
political power that exceeds their formal economic or management power. Leading directors and
officers at large corporatized state-controlled enterprises are often Communist Party
nomenklatura appointments or representatives of central government institutions. The same is
true of insiders at enterprises controlled by local governments or subordinate Party levels. And
even if insiders are not directly tied to the Party or state, they are often part of a system (xitong)
of connected actors with overwhelming political and economic power. Thus, any legal
mechanism that empowers minority shareholders to attack the misdeeds of such insiders also
empowers weak political-economic actors to constrain or penalize vastly superior forces in
Chinese society. 4
b. Corporatization and Its Effects
The development of derivative suits in China cannot be understood outside of the
political and economic history of the PRC over the past several decades.
The early stages of post-Mao economic reform saw efforts by policy-makers to reform
traditional state-owned enterprises (“SOEs”), enterprises plagued by low productivity,
unresponsiveness to economic signals, and waste. The traditional SOE was not simply a
corporation wholly owned by a single shareholder, the state. Instead, it is more aptly seen as a
division or aggregation of productive assets within the loosely organized firm of China, Inc. It
had managers that could move up a bureaucratic hierarchy into progressively more politically
powerful positions. The traditional SOE did not issue any ownership interests in itself, much
less something like stock or transferable equity interests. Moreover, the “control” interest in
SOEs—for example, the right to appoint management and appropriate profits—was not
necessarily in the hands of the same administrative body representing the central state (or not
necessarily at the central level). SOEs could be effectively controlled by subordinate units of
government at or above the county level even if formally subject to the control of a central line
ministry.
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An excellent example of the forces at play is the Zhejiang Golden Bridge CLS 2003 judgment,
described infra at text accompanying note 55.
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The policy of corporatization essentially sought to abolish the traditional SOE as an
organizational form by converting SOEs into some form of company authorized under and
governed by the PRC Company Law: (i) a CLS, the approximate equivalent of a Delaware
corporation or the German Aktiengesellschaft, (ii) an LLC, intended for a much smaller and more
closely knit group of investors, or (iii) a wholly state-owned LLC, a special type of LLC that is
wholly owned by a state agency and has no shareholders’ meeting (effectively, an SOE given
enterprise legal person status as a sub-species of LLC). In most cases, this process did not
involve privatization or withdrawal of the Party-state from the economy because a controlling
share of the stock in the converted enterprise went to non-private entities. Even after two
decades, the Party-state, at the central and local levels, remains firmly committed to retaining
control over enterprises in many sectors. This is true for both the usual suspects for state
control—national security-related industries, natural monopolies, sectors providing important
public goods and services, and important enterprises in pillar industries and the increasingly
supported high-technology sector—and other enterprises that are profitable for insiders or locallevel control parties and can be promoted with public investment. In particular, this strategy of
corporatization without privatization coupled with maintenance of central and local state control
has determined ownership, control, and governance structures in China’s listed companies,
whether listed on China’s domestic exchanges, in Hong Kong, or internationally. In particular,
control by a single state shareholder is quite common in Chinese listed companies. A study of
corporate governance conducted in 2002 by the China Securities Regulatory Commission
(“CSRC”) and the State Economic and Trade Commission found that of 1,051 controlling
shareholders in the 1,175 listed companies studied, 77 percent could be considered “of a state
nature” (guojia xingzhi), while in 390 companies a single state shareholder held over half of the
shares. 5
This pattern of ownership and control has important implications for China’s corporate
law and corporate governance regime in general and the derivative lawsuit in particular:
First, the state’s policy of maintaining a full or controlling interest in enterprises in
various sectors leads to a fundamental dilemma in Chinese corporate governance. The state
wants the enterprises it controls absolutely and owns partially to be run efficiently, but not solely
for the purpose of shareholder wealth maximization. A necessary element of state control of an
enterprise is the use of that control for purposes other than the maximization of its wealth as a
shareholder—purposes such as the maintenance of urban employment levels, direct control over
sensitive industries, effective price control in a given sector, politically-motivated job placement,
or extraction of profits for politically-privileged insiders. But in using its control for these
purposes, the state openly—and not necessarily fraudulently (for that see below)—exploits
minority shareholders who have no other way to benefit from their investment. As long as state
policy requires the state to remain an active controlling investor in firms of which it is not the
sole shareholder, meaningful legal protection for minority shareholders will mean either
constraints on the state's ability to do precisely those things for which it has retained control, or
else a de facto separate legal regime (at least as far as minority shareholder rights are concerned)
for enterprises in which the state is the dominant shareholder. But a separate legal regime would
require the maintenance of a strict boundary between state-controlled companies on the one hand
and other companies on the other, a boundary that it was precisely the ambition of the
5
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corporatization policy and the promulgation of the Company Law to erase. The failure to face
this question squarely has made it extremely difficult to formulate legal rules on the duties of
insiders and controlling shareholders in these newly-created, and absolutely dominated, firms.
Second, the prevalence of concentrated ownership in Chinese firms means that the main
agency problem in Chinese corporate governance is not vertical, between disaggregated
shareholders and managers, but horizontal, between minority shareholders and controlling
shareholders. In this respect, China is like most of the world. What is exceptional, however, is
the identity of the controlling shareholder. In most cases, it either is or is closely connected to a
governmental entity or Party organization. This means there is a higher likelihood that a
shareholder lawsuit or a derivative suit involving a corporatized entity, especially a politically
privileged one which has been allowed to access the public capital markets, will in substance be
directed at a Party group, the state, a state-affiliated agency, or the agent of any of those. The
claim will therefore be politically sensitive, something that is likely to affect the willingness and
ability of judicial institutions to accept the lawsuit and hear the underlying claim.
The political sensitivity of such lawsuits is even clearer when we note that an important
legacy of this reform process is that the administrative channels of control present in the
traditional SOE have not disappeared, but often continue to function in the shadows, supplanting
the formal channels envisaged in the Company Law. 6 For instance, the board of directors may
be bypassed entirely in matters such as appointment of the chief executive officer or other
important operational decisions. Instead, the government agency that controlled the firm before
its restructuring (or the Party structure behind that state institution) will issue instructions in
much the same way after restructuring. Thus, in considering the viability of derivative actions in
the PRC, analysts and the corporate law itself must always take account of the pervasive state
presence inside large corporations in many sectors—in particular, in publicly listed companies –
and be alert to the presence of critically important norms, practices, and lines of authority that
simply do not show up in any state laws or regulations and are typically not mentioned at all in
corporate disclosure documents. 7
Third, the reform-era corporate capital structures outlined above are an invitation to
opportunism, abuse, and outright fraud by controlling shareholders and insiders, an invitation
which has been taken up with gusto at both CLSs (publicly-listed or not) and closely held firms.
As our case reports show, closely held firms are a fertile setting for fraud, looting and asset
stripping, minority shareholder oppression, and mismanagement. And problems in public
companies—despite mandatory PRC and foreign disclosure requirements, the power of PRC and
foreign securities and stock exchange regulators, and the threat of foreign securities class action
suits—are even worse. Public companies have been run as vehicles to attract passive investment
capital from the stock markets and serve the needs of the controlling shareholder (and its
6
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For example, the A-share (Shanghai) and H-share (Hong Kong) prospectuses for the
Agricultural Bank of China’s recent initial public offering are almost completely silent on the role of the
Communist Party in the bank. The Party’s presence is indicated only obliquely, in the biography of one
officer who is also the secretary of the bank’s (Party) discipline inspection committee. Outside of the
biographies of key personnel, the word “Party” (dang) does not appear at all. As one of us has noted
elsewhere, the same was true for the earlier Bank of China and Industrial and Commercial Bank of China
offerings. See Howson (2009), pp. 140-1 and footnote 16.
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insiders). 8 Tunneling by individual insiders and controlling shareholders, both state and nonstate, by means of related-party transactions is notorious; in 2002 tunneling by controlling
shareholders was estimated at 96.7 billion yuan, equivalent to the total amount of money raised
in stock markets in the same year, 9 and by the following year it had doubled. 10 It is easy to
understand, therefore, why policy-makers in the early 2000s sought to address this and other
governance problems by amending the 1994 Company Law wholesale to enhance judicial
remedies available to minority shareholders against insiders and controlling shareholders. 11 The
2006 Company Law accomplishes this goal in formal terms, with the derivative action in Article
152 a key element in making the new substantive causes of action on corporate fiduciary duties,
shareholder oppression, and related-party transactions truly justiciable or at least immune to the
blocking power held by controlling shareholders and their designated directors and officers. In
2008 Jin Jianfeng, Chief Judge of the Supreme People’s Court No. 2 Civil Division (the
department of the Court occupied with corporate law litigation), highlighted this critical aspect of
the derivative lawsuit mechanism when he wrote, “If we don’t establish a shareholders’
derivative lawsuit system, the articles of the Company Law will be useless and empty
provisions.” 12
c. The LLC Form and Other Non-Company Law Forms
The LLC and its informal close company analogues are at the center of almost all of our
derivative lawsuit cases. That is true for two reasons: because the courts do not accept cases
related to widely-held CLSs, and because a significant amount of business undertaken in
contemporary China is not related to the CLS form (whether or not sourced in traditional
SOEs). 13
In fact, a large amount of investment and commercial activity is effected through
arrangements that are neither corporate (CLS or LLC) nor have anything much to do with the
PRC Company Law of whatever vintage. Many investment or capital aggregation transactions in
China are based in contractual arrangements such as “agreements” (xieyi), “joint operations”
(lianying), “cooperative” (hezuo) or non-legal person “partnership” (hehuo) arrangements. 14
Even when something resembling a business organization is established, and even if formal
“enterprise legal person” status is conferred on the entity by registration with the appropriate
bureau of the State Administration of Industry and Commerce, the resulting firm very often has
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This is stated explicitly in the influential “Corporate Governance Report” issued by the
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Glory Project 2009 cases.
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no legal basis in the PRC Company Law or the various foreign-invested enterprise (“FIE”)
statutes and their implementing regulations. 15
This persistent instability in corporate legal identity and corporate law application leads
to difficulties in applying a derivative action meant for the corporate form. For example, the
Chongqing Coal Mine 2006 case features an LLC established around a coal mine asset. The
investor in the coal mine LLC is listed as a government bureau (ju), but another LLC (acting for
the bureau) attempts to initiate a derivative action on behalf of the coal mine LLC against a
factory (chang) possibly without independent legal personality. These transitional identities
provide ample defenses for the defendants, which are effective in the first-instance hearing but
are rejected on appeal.
Another case, Beijing Golden Century 2009, seems a relatively straightforward corporate
derivative action. Two LLC shareholders sue the company’s Legal Representative, director and
general manager (the same person) to wrest back control of the company after a unanimous
shareholders’ resolution ousting him from any role in it. Straightforward, that is, until the
opinion recites that the LLC exists only in the most formal sense, that the plaintiff shareholders
never contributed capital to the enterprise, and that the equity interests in the LLC have already
been distributed to 43 peasants (in exchange for contributions of land use rights) acting through a
“rural cooperative.” The defendant’s key defense is that the plaintiffs are not true shareholders
of the LLC whose interests they purport to be protecting, and thus their “shareholders’
resolution” ousting the defendant is void. Both the basic-level court and the intermediate court
on appeal are forced to rely on pure formalities (the registration of shareholder status and
attendant promises to contribute capital) to permit the derivative claim. Likewise, the Beijing
Tonghua Online 2009 opinion allows a derivative action on behalf of an LLC transformed from a
collectively-owned enterprise, but the court has to use both the “Township Collectively-Owned
Enterprise Provisions” and the 2006 Company Law to reject the underlying claim of breach of
duty of loyalty by an LLC fiduciary because an “all-workers” meeting at the collective (doing
double duty as an investors’ meeting for the LLC) constituted prior approval of the allegedly
breaching action.
These forms – whether LLCs or informal analogues that have continued or grown
organically – are far more like partnerships (with corporate personality) than corporations with
strict separation between ownership and management. The norms governing corporations differ
significantly from those governing partnerships, and touch on every major area of enterprise law.
Most important in this chapter is the lack of separation of ownership and management in the
partnership-like LLC entities. This lack of separation throws into doubt the suitability of
corporate derivative actions for entities such as LLCs and contracted partnerships where there is
no separation between ownership and management, and management cannot therefore absolutely
block a lawsuit against itself brought by other investors, whether in their own name or in that of
the entity. In partnership-like entities, any partner can act as an agent for the partnership. Not
only that, but the vector of duties is different: in corporations, fiduciaries owe duties to the
corporation and in very special situations to the shareholders, whereas in partnerships, partners
owe duties not only to the partnership, but also to the other partners. Thus, in many of the cases
15
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we now see in the PRC, courts hearing a derivative lawsuit will reject the claim and instead urge
the shareholder-partners to lodge a direct claim against their co-investors. We see this in the
Beijing Jindao Hongping Advertisng 2008, Beijing Glory Project 2009, and Shanghai Tianguang
Medical 2009 cases. In the alternative, courts will allow mixed claims by the company: against
both controlling shareholders for oppression and against fiduciaries (often the same parties as the
controlling shareholders) for breach of fiduciary duties (typically the duty of loyalty). 16
If China’s corporate landscape is dominated by closely-held corporate partnerships, then
China’s judiciary faces a difficult task in wielding the corporate derivative action with respect to
them. Certainly the mechanism will be useful in allowing a close corporation/corporate
partnership registered as a company under the Company Law that has been damaged to sue those
who have caused the damage (whether traditional fiduciaries or third parties). However, equally
often, individual shareholders qua (effective) partners will suffer harm, and should be entitled to
sue under a direct claim against co-equal partners (who are characterized as management in the
corporate form). Thus, what may appear to be failure to apply a new corporate doctrine (i.e.,
non-application of the new derivative lawsuit mechanism) may in fact be a highly competent and
principled application of business enterprise law. The Dongfang Construction Group 2009 case
demonstrates this. There the 0.68% shareholder in an LLC sues a 10.78% shareholder and
company director for the gratis transfer of a significant receivable by the company to the
defendant shareholder/director without shareholder approval. The underlying breach is correctly
identified as a breach of the investor/director’s duty of loyalty; more appropriately, the injury is
described as being applicable to “the company’s other shareholders” (sunhaile gongsi qita
gudong de quanyi) rather than “the company” and thus the direct claim by the mere 0.68%
shareholder against another breaching shareholder is upheld.
d. The Legal Representative
Another somewhat unique feature animating derivative lawsuits in the PRC is the
singular position of the “Legal Representative” (fading daibiaoren) in Chinese law and practice.
Notwithstanding the election of directors and supervisors and appointment of officers, the
position familiar from civil law systems is still used uniformly in Chinese corporations (and
addressed in the 2006 Company Law). While the new Company Law allows any duly appointed
person to represent that legal person (pursuant to authorization by the shareholders or board of
directors), the Legal Representative is in the view of most PRC civil and judicial actors
intrinsically authorized to represent the company, and in the (mistaken) view of many,
exclusively authorized to act for the company. Moreover, for many corporate actors, only the
specific person who is the Legal Representative can affix the all-important corporate seals (or
“chops”) necessary to confirm corporate action, such as the signature of contracts or
commencement of a lawsuit. Accordingly, many of the derivative lawsuits analyzed in this
chapter – especially in the LLC context—arise where the Legal Representative refuses to act for
the company in enforcing an obligation or suing breaching fiduciaries, or refuses to give over the
corporate chops necessary for corporate action. This situation may seem strange to Western or
Anglo-American system lawyers, but obstacles erected by an inactive or opposing Legal
Representative who will not allow use of the corporate seals can be near absolute, and in many
cases trump the power of a unanimous shareholders’ or board resolution (at least in the short
term).
16
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e. The Chinese Judiciary – Local Protectionism, Party Control, and
Avoidance of “Mass” Litigant Cases
As noted earlier, the more important the political-economic actor involved in a lawsuit,
the more likely the lawsuit is to be politically sensitive and subject to various kinds of obstacles
and interference. The management and controlling shareholders of significant companies are
likely to be influential—certainly in the area where the company is headquartered, employs
workers, and pays taxes, and often nationally. Indeed, the controlling shareholders may even be
governmental or quasi-governmental bodies of some kind, or tied to Party organizational
structures. Therefore, pressure may be brought to bear on courts to protect such actors from
claims against them. Local political power—formally, the local People’s Congresses, and in
reality, the local Communist Party organization—controls courts both informally and formally
through the power of appointment and power over budgets. This means that local Party and state
officials—and those who have influence over them—have considerable power over courts. An
extensive study of local protectionism in the courts found that “when confronted with
interference, disturbance and influence exerted by various external forces, the judiciary has to
surrender itself to the external pressure and cater for the needs of local interests.” 17 Indeed,
Communist Party committees can and do issue instructions to courts telling them how to handle
particular cases. Some areas have a specific rule providing that where a party from outside the
jurisdiction sues a local enterprise, the court must get permission from the local Party leadership
to hear the case, or the court is ordered to judge the case in accordance with the instructions of
the Party committee. 18
Courts are particularly reluctant to get involved in lawsuits involving multiple plaintiffs
or the interests of multiple parties, and various rules and practices reflecting the state’s own
distaste for such suits reinforce that reluctance. Sometimes, courts directly instruct lower courts
not to take multiple-plaintiff lawsuits at all. 19 In securities litigation, which by its nature tends to
involve many shareholder parties, the Supreme People’s Court has issued instructions to lower
courts that strictly limit the claims that litigants may make under the Securities Law as well as
the procedures for bringing them. 20 The political sensitivity of group litigation is further shown
in the Supreme People’s Court’s efforts to push multi-plaintiff litigation down to the lowest level
possible within the court system so that plaintiff groups will not physically take their case to
provincial capitals (if appeal lies with a Higher-Level People’s Court) or to Beijing (if appeal lies
with the Supreme People’s Court). 21 Courts have also sometimes required plaintiffs wishing to
17
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18
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People’s Court had instructed all lower courts in Shanghai not to accept suits with ten or more plaintiffs.
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litigate together to separate their claims into smaller groups. In the first permitted shareholder
litigation on false or misleading disclosure, for example, the Harbin intermediate court required
the original 381 plaintiffs to split up into smaller groups of ten to twenty persons. 22
Restrictions have also been placed on group litigation even before the plaintiffs get to
court. In March, 2006, for example, the All-China Lawyers Association—a governmentcontrolled body that, together with the national Ministry of Justice and its local-government
counterpart Judicial Bureaus, is in charge of lawyers in China—issued a regulation entitled
“Guidance Opinion on the Undertaking by Lawyers of Mass Cases,” applying to all suits with
ten or more plaintiffs. 23 This regulation requires lawyers taking such cases to report to
government bodies and “accept supervision and guidance” from them.
Derivative suits are not, of course, class actions, and could in theory have a single
initiating shareholder plaintiff. But PRC judges will be aware that derivative suits involving
widely-held or listed companies will necessarily implicate the interests on one side of large
numbers of shareholders even if they are not formally plaintiffs, and on the other of influential
and politically-backed corporate managers and controlling shareholders. It is therefore
reasonable to think that much of the reluctance to take multi-party suits with some political
sensitivity will spill over into derivative suits where widely-held or listed companies are
involved. 24
f. Derivative v. Representative
The derivative action is the subject of considerable doctrinal confusion in China,
affecting both the surrounding discourse and judgments in actual cases. Because the classic
derivative action outside of China often involves a large number of shareholders, for many years
PRC analysts pointed to the “group action” (gongtong susong) provided for in China’s Law on
Civil Procedure as somehow related to the shareholders’ derivative action. This is plainly
wrong: the group action in Chinese civil procedure merely allows for the aggregation of a
number of litigants with the same or similar claims against one or a group of defendants.
Similarly, many PRC experts and most opinion-writing judges refer to the derivative action as a
“representative action” (daibiao susong), instead of the correct, directly-translated term of art
“paisheng [or yansheng] susong.” 25 Indeed, nowhere in the 2006 Company Law are these
characters used for a derivative lawsuit; instead, Article 152 speaks of shareholders bringing an
22
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All-China Lawyers Association (2006). For an English-language news report, see Anon.

(2006).
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As Prof. Tang Xin of the Tsinghua University Faculty of Law states, “[T]he court system is not
active in hearing corporate and securities cases. Listed companies and their officers still have a certain
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reluctant to take cases involving complicated reasoning and powerful defendants.” Tang (2008), p. 147.
See also Howson (2010).
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use the term “daibiao susong” (“representative lawsuit”) instead of the term of art that accurately conveys
the derivative nature of the claim.
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action against defendants “in their own names … in the interest of the company” (weile gongsi
de liyi yi ziji de mingyi). Just as with the “group action” noted above, the “representative action”
applies only to a situation where one party among a group of named litigants “represents” the
interests of the group in the judicial proceeding. This problem becomes substantively important,
certainly in the pre-2006 environment, where some litigants fight over the availability of a legal
basis for “derivative” vs. “representative” lawsuits. 26 It also infects the ongoing conversation in
the PRC regarding perfection of the derivative lawsuit, as for example when the Supreme
People’s Court justifies the one-percent shareholding threshold for CLS derivative actions
because it ensures that the plaintiffs are in some sense “representative” of all the shareholders’
interest.
g. Costs, Cost Allocation, and Cost-Benefit for Shareholder Plaintiffs
If a lawsuit cannot be financed, it cannot occur. Typical financing mechanisms include
various combinations of contingency fees, a loser-pays rule, an order whereby the company
whose interest is being protected bears the burden if the derivative suit is accepted (i.e.,
regardless of the success of the underlying claim), and a “common fund” rule where plaintiff’s
attorney’s fees come from the corporate recovery, not the plaintiff. In addition, other
jurisdictions such as Taiwan have experimented with a quasi-public foundation whose mission is
to bring such lawsuits. 27
Chinese civil procedure is not now well suited to supporting these financing
mechanisms. 28 The basic rule of Chinese civil procedure is that the loser pays various costs of
litigation and court fees, but attorney’s fees are not included in costs of litigation and so are
borne directly by the parties. 29 Filing fees in the PRC are calculated as a fraction of the amount
in controversy, with plaintiffs usually required to pay such fees up front before acceptance of the
action. 30 Moreover, law firms usually require a retainer of over half of the total predicted fees. 31
While these up-front payments may pose few difficulties for a corporate plaintiff of reasonable
size, individual shareholder plaintiffs might find them difficult to make. 32
Another way of funding derivative litigation is through the contingency fees. In the postMao era of legal system construction, contingency fees in the PRC have been frowned upon.
26

See, for example, the Zhejiang Golden Bridge CLS 2003 case (court distinguishes between a
“representative” lawsuit brought by 4 plaintiffs on behalf of 165 other shareholders (for which there is a
legal basis) and a “derivative” lawsuit seeking remedy for harm to the company (for which there is, at the
time, no explicit legal basis)).
27

See Milhaupt (2004); Tang (2008), pp. 153-4; and Wallace Wang Wen-yeu and Wang-Ruu
Tseng’s chapter on Taiwan in this volume.
28

On issues of funding for derivative suits in China, see generally Zhang (2008).

29

See State Council (2007), Arts. 6, 29.

30

See Civil Procedure Law, Article 107; Supreme People’s Court (1989); see also Zhang (2008),
pp. 559-561, and Hong and Goo (2009), pp. 392-3.
31

See Xiao and Tang (2010), pp. 10-11.

32

See Xiao and Tang (2010), pp. 10-11.
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Over the past several years, however, they have come to be accepted in practice. In 2006, the
central government issued a regulation specifically allowing contingency fees of up to 30%, but
not in specified class of cases including unpaid wages, spousal support, inheritance, marriage,
and—most pertinently for our purposes—multi-plaintiff lawsuits, underscoring once again the
state’s particular concern with, and desire to discourage, this type of litigation. 33 As noted above,
derivative suits need not in form be multi-plaintiff lawsuits; a single initiating shareholder will
suffice. But assuming the state’s concern is with the substantive spectacle of numerous
interested parties and not with the mere form, it is reasonable to suppose that the policy might be
applied to derivative suits involving widely-held companies as well.
It should be noted that to state the formal rule is not necessarily to describe actual
practice, and therefore the system has more flexibility than might at first appear. Contingency
fees have been allowed at a time when they were formally prohibited, and we show in this
chapter that derivative suits themselves were allowed before they were formally sanctioned in
the 2006 Company Law. By the same token, even in the absence of specific statutory
authorization, courts have on occasion shown hospitality to fee-shifting in favor of winning
plaintiffs, at least in consumer cases. 34 In preliminary research on this issue, one of us found that
in more than half the cases in which plaintiffs asked for attorneys’ fees and won their case, the
courts were willing as a matter of law to award attorneys’ fees. Thus, it appears that in practice
the rule against awards of attorney’s fees is not an insuperable obstacle. The real question is
whether courts will be willing as a practical matter to do so. 35
III.

Derivative Actions Before 2006

Despite the absence of a firm statutory basis in law, derivative actions were accepted and
heard in Chinese courts before 2006 and the entry into force of the 2006 Company Law. The
history of derivative actions before their formal recognition in law shows that when they desire
to do so, Chinese courts in both their rule-making and adjudicatory capacities can readily create
and apply rules on their own even when they run counter to formally superior rules.
In this section, we find a pattern that is quite common in other fields of Chinese law: a
central-level policy disfavoring a practice, limited experimentation with the practice at subcentral levels (often through the courts), and eventual formal incorporation into central-level
norms. We further find lower-court practice occasionally overstepping the bounds laid out by
apparently “superior” statute, higher courts and regulatory authorities.
a. Non-Statutory Rulemaking: CSRC Principles, SPC Utterances, Local
“Opinions” and the (Draft) “Omnibus” Regulation on the 1994 Company
Law
In the absence of enabling legislation from the center, before 2006 local governments and
non-legislative bodies were not idle. In January 2002, the China Securities Regulatory

33

See SDRC and MOJ (2006), Art. 11.

34

See the discussion in Clarke (2009), pp. 253-255; see also Tu (2009).

35

In the cases reviewed here, we find evidence only of court-mandated sharing of litigation filing
fees, etc., and no recitation of how attorneys’ fees were allocated. See infra notes 95 and 96 and
accompanying text.
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Commission (“CSRC”) issued its “Principles of Corporate Governance for Listed Companies,” 36
which stated at Article 4:
The directors, supervisory board members, and managers of the company shall
bear liability for compensation in cases where they violate law, administrative
regulation or the Articles of Association and cause damage to the company during
the performance of their duties. Shareholders shall have the right to request the
company to sue for such compensation in accordance with law (emphasis added).
As authorization for a derivative lawsuit in China, the Principles have several defects. First, and
most obviously, they are not legislation. They are in effect suggestions from the CSRC as to
how companies should organize their internal governance. They provide no legal basis for
shareholders to bring, or courts to accept, derivative pleadings. Second, they merely authorize
the shareholders to request that the company sue. But shareholders did not need the Principles to
authorize them to communicate with directors and officers about desired corporate action. What
is special about demand in derivative actions is that typically it is a required step, and a condition
precedent, not simply an authorized one. Indeed, shareholders wishing to sue on behalf of the
company might be happier without it.
Less than a year later, in December 2002, a senior Supreme People’s Court judge stated
publicly that courts should accept derivative suits. 37 A lower court subsequently found these
remarks inadequate as a basis for accepting a derivative suit, calling them “for reference”
only.”.38 Nevertheless, there is good reason to believe that the remarks were a sign of internal
conversations taking place within the court system. From late 2002 to 2004, for example, the
Higher-Level People’s Courts (one level below the Supreme People’s Court and responsible for
courts at the provincial level) of Zhejiang, Jiangsu, Shanghai, and Beijing all issued “Opinions” 39
permitting the use of the derivative suit mechanism in courts under their jurisdiction, and
describing their implementation in great detail. 40 For example, the Shanghai Opinion affirms the
inclusion of controlling shareholders and third parties as potential defendants; identifies the
participation of the company as a “third party”; authorizes judicial determination of whether the
company has been harmed, the causal connection between the defendants’ actions and the harm,
any good faith defenses available to the defendants, and the degree of control exercised by the
controlling shareholder defendant over the corporate entity inhibiting the underlying action;
forbids settlement that will disadvantage the real parties in interest (minority shareholders in the

36

CSRC (2002).

37

See Anon. (2002).

38

See Anon. (2003b); see also Qian (2003).

39

Chinese courts below the Supreme People’s Court level and governmental bodies often issue
documents labeled “Opinions” (yijian) setting forth proposed rules on various issues. Opinions can be
binding in varying degrees. They should not be confused with the term “opinion” as used to indicate a
court decision in a particular case, or “Explanations: (jieshi) or “Regulations” (guiding) issued by the
Supreme People’s Court.
40

See Zhejiang HLPC (2002) (hereinafter Zhejiang Opinion), Jiangsu HLPC (2003) (hereinafter
Jiangsu Opinion), Shanghai HLPC (2003) (hereinafter Shanghai Opinion), and Beijing HLPC (2004)
(hereinafter Beijing Opinion).
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company); 41 empowers the court to annul offending transactions; and allows for damage awards
against not only the defendants but also the company. This level of detail is strong evidence that
local-level courts were in fact accepting and adjudicating derivative lawsuits well before 2006.
In fact, one pre- 2006 case report in our sample 42 actually cites to the Beijing Opinion (Article 8)
as the basis for a derivative claim, which fails because of no demand.
The Supreme People’s Court also demonstrated its approval in a more formal way than
through casual remarks by senior judges. As early as 1994, in connection with the Zhangjiagang
Fibre Company 1994 case noted immediately below, it had issued a document approving a
derivative-type action by the Jiangsu courts. And in 2003, with significant PRC academic input,
it distributed for comment a draft regulation (the “Omnibus Regulation”) for lower courts that
substantially re-wrote the Company Law and, inter alia, provided for a derivative suit
mechanism. 43 Finally, in 2005—and on the eve of the coming into effect of the 2006 Company
Law with new Article 152 in it—the Supreme People’s Court approved a decision of the Beijing
Higher-Level People’s Court recognizing a derivative action. 44
b. Pre-2006 Cases
Several cases arising before 2006 show how the derivative suit mechanism was
implemented in practice, sometimes in accordance with the documents and regulations described
above, sometimes by the PRC courts acting entirely autonomously.
i. Genesis of the 1994 SPC Approving Response and Other LLC
Cases
Case collections and opinions show that well before January 1, 2006, PRC plaintiffs
brought derivative pleadings to court, and Chinese courts accepted derivative pleadings or
affirmatively restructured claims to allow pleadings on behalf of corporate entities. There are of
course limits to the conclusions we can draw from these opinions; we do not know, for example,
whether such accepted cases, or the cases that actually went to trial and produced an opinion,
represent a large or a small proportion of attempts to file such suits.
The first acknowledgement of the derivative mechanism after promulgation of the 1994
Company Law came in the Zhangjiagang Fiber Company 1994 case, which gave rise to the
Supreme People’s Court Approving Response noted above. This case was in the limited area of
foreign direct investment, and, initially at least, apparently relevant only to Chinese-foreign
equity or cooperative joint ventures where the foreign investor was also the technology
licensor/transferor to the same joint venture. However, as we show immediately below, the same
case, the permitted derivative action, and the Approving Response were all used to support a
post-2006 judgment (on pre-2006 facts) concerning an entirely domestically invested venture. 45
41

A concern in one of our reported cases, which apparently made it to the Supreme People’s
Court before being settled, see Tonghe Investment 2009.
42

Beijing Taiqun Technology 2006.

43

See Supreme People’s Court (2003b) (hereinafter “Omnibus Regulation”). The draft regulation
never made it to the stage of formal issuance, and was made moot by the 2006 Company Law.
44

China Zhongqi Futures 2004-6.

45

Guangzhou Tianhe Scitech 2003.
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In the Zhangjiagang Fiber Company 1994 case, the Jiangsu Higher People’s Court asked
the Supreme People’s Court for guidance on the question of whether a factory, the Chinese
investor in a Chinese-foreign equity joint venture (the “JV”), could represent the JV in suing a
vendor to the JV (and a related party to the foreign investor in the JV). The Supreme People’s
Court responded that the Chinese factory could indeed exercise the litigation rights of the JV, but
in this particular case would not be able to do so because of a pre-existing arbitration agreement
in the contract between the JV and the vendor.
This was a first specific acknowledgement by the apex of the PRC judiciary of the
legitimacy of a derivative action, although hedged with so many conditions as to make it appear
of limited broader applicability. However, the Approving Response quickly proved useful in
non-FIE-related cases. For instance, it was cited as a legal basis in the pre-2006 CLS-related
Zhejiang Wu Fang Zhai 2001 case. And, in a second important case —the largest derivative
action-related award to date in the PRC—the Guangdong Higher-Level People’s Court used the
1994 Supreme People’s Court Approving Response as the basis for ordering damages of 400
million yuan to an entirely domestic enterprise. 46 This Guangzhou Tianhe Scitech 2003 decision
is noteworthy not only for its use of the 1994 Supreme People’s Court Approving Response
where FIEs were not involved, but also because the Guangdong court issued its judgment after
January 1, 2006. This means it could have applied newly-effective Article 152 of the 2006
Company Law to the facts of the case (as our latter discussion of straddling 47 will make clear),
but chose not to do so. The 1994 Supreme People’s Court Approving Response also proved
immensely useful to the plaintiff shareholder in the Guangzhou case, as it allowed the court to
reject defendant’s sensible assertion that the derivative pleadings should be thrown out because
the plaintiff shareholder had not complied with the pre-suit demand requirements of Article
152. 48
After the 1994 Supreme People’s Court Approving Response, there is evidence of other
derivative pleadings in the Chinese courts in a number of cases from 1996 through 2005. 49 Most
interesting for this chapter is the fact that in these cases, Chinese courts on their own reasoned
their way to the derivative action in order to provide plaintiffs with a remedy. As the report of
the Xiamen Xinda 1997 case stated:
If the infringement suffered by the shareholder is to the rights of the company, then the
shareholder should first present a written application to the organ of power of the
company requesting that the company take action or bring litigation against the party

46

See Guangzhou Tianhe Scitech 2003.

47

As described infra, straddling actions are those which use the post-January 1, 2006 Company
Law to adjudicate facts arising before January 1, 2006.
48

This is a defense which works very well in a number of the post-2006 cases noted here, such as
Shanghai Peieryou 2006, Shunde Zhaoyu Electronic Hardware 2007, Beijing Dingyu Cable 2008, and
Kunming Kangpaili Technology 2009 (but see contra Beijing Golden Century 2009 and Huangshan
Fenghua Real Estate 2009).
49

See Shanghai Yanzhong Water Company 1996-97, Xiamen Xinda 1997, Beijing Taishan 2000,
Unknown Beijing Parties 2001, Huangshan Fenghua Real Estate 2009, and Beijing Taiqun Technology
2006.
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inflicting the harm and pursue its legal liability. Where the company does not take any
action, the shareholder may in its stead bring a lawsuit. 50
Or, as the opinion in the Unknown Beijing Parties 2001 case reasoned:
In the present case, because [Defendant A] is the chairman of the board of directors of the
company and because by law and under the company’s Articles of Association he
convenes the board meeting and presides over it, he should be responsible for calling a
board meeting so that the board can make resolutions regarding major issues that arise in
the course of company operations. [Plaintiff] believes that board chairman [Defendant
A] and general manager [Defendant B] have taken actions which injure the interests of
the company. In this situation, there is no way that [Defendant A], as a conflicted party,
will convene a board meeting to address his own actions, just as there is no way he can
represent the company in bringing litigation [against himself]. Thus, [Plaintiff], as a
shareholder of the company, has the ability to represent the company in appropriate
litigation, with the goal behind the litigation being to protect the lawful rights and
interests of the company and its [other] shareholders. 51
Perhaps most importantly, the Supreme People’s Court itself implicitly affirmed a
derivative action before 2006 – and in an actual case decision, 52 not in an “approving response”
like the 1994 instruction engendered by the Zhangjiagang Fibre Company 1994 case. In
affirming a lower-court judgment allowing a derivative-type action, on December 18, 2005 the
Supreme People’s Court also implicitly affirmed the viability of derivative pleadings in the
Chinese courts. 53
ii. Widely-held Companies
Almost all of the successful cases involving derivative pleadings from before 2006
involve close corporations—usually LLCs. There is, however, evidence that Chinese courts
accepted at least a few derivative cases involving CLSs, and even publicly-listed companies. 54
A remarkable pre-2006 case involving a CLS 55 indicates some of the stakes involved in
CLS-related cases, publicly-listed or not. The case arose from the promotion of a CLS just as
50

Xie and Chen (2001), p. 24.

51

Beijing No. 1 Intermediate People’s Court (2005), pp. 362-363. The (unidentified) secondinstance court hearing the appeal, and even the Beijing intermediate court judge commenting on the case,
do not take issue with this derivative claim apparently constructed out of whole cloth.
52

China Zhongqi Futures 2004-6.

53

Albeit after promulgation of the new (2006) Company Law form, which included Article 152
that would become effective just thirteen days later. The lawyers representing the plaintiffs wryly note
that the Beijing Higher People’s Court rendered its judgment without once invoking the idea of, or legal
basis for, “derivative” or “shareholders’ representative” actions, and seemed to accept without comment
the idea that these shareholders are allowed to plead a cause of action on behalf of the corporation they
are invested in. See Zhao & Wu (2007), p. 274.
54

See Zhejiang Wu Fang Zhai 2001, Henan Lianhua MSG 2004 (listed company), and Shanghai
Lujiazui 2005.
55

See Zhejiang Golden Bridge CLS 2003.
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China’s 1994 Company Law went into effect, and the receipt—on trust—by a company run by
the Shaoxing County government of 35 million yuan from more than 160 public investors for the
capitalization of a future CLS, in which the trustee was to also be a 30% shareholder. The
trustee company never forwarded the funds to the CLS after it was established, and so upon
liquidation the public shareholders sued the trustee company on behalf of the CLS. The case and
the opinion resulting are remarkable because of the politically powerful parties involved as
defendants, the impleading of the Shaoxing County government as a named defendant on what
resembles a piercing theory to be jointly and severally liable with its alter ego, the acceptance of
a case involving a widely-held CLS (and almost 170 irate investors), and the sophisticated
reasoning which permits a shareholder derivative action despite the lack of statutory basis for it
at the time. As the judges in the case state:
[A]lthough the party directly harmed by inappropriate action by the controlling
shareholder is the company, it is extremely difficult for the company to defend its
rights in its own name when it is under the control of the party acting
inappropriately. . . . We do not agree with [the defendants’] responsive assertion
that the plaintiff has no power to represent the company to bring the litigation. . .
. To protect the rights and interest of the company, the listing of the [company] as
a third party in this case is not in violation of Article 56 of the PRC Civil
Procedure Law. 56
This kind of case, involving a widely-held CLS with a large number of shareholders as plaintiffs
and with government-controlled corporate entities and government departments as defendants,
will be very rare even after an unambiguous statutory basis is provided in the 2006 Company
Law.
IV.

The 2006 Company Law and Statutory Authorization for Derivative Actions

The derivative lawsuit mechanism authorized in Article 152 of the 2006 Company Law is
distinct from the derivative action received from the Anglo-American or continental traditions,
including the systems in place for the Republic of China (Taiwan) and Japan.
Article 152’s rule cannot be simply stated, because it makes several distinctions not
found in the systems of other countries. First, the procedural rules distinguish between LLCs
and CLSs. Second, the substantive claims that may be brought on behalf of the company allow
claims against both (i) traditional corporate fiduciaries (directors, officers and supervisors) and
(ii) what are called “others” which includes controlling shareholders and third parties (with the
basis of the underlying claims against each also differing slightly).
The rule may be summarized as follows:
1.

56

Defendants and associated causes of actions: Initiating shareholders may bring a
derivative lawsuit against (i) directors, supervisory board members, or senior
management who have violated law (falü), administrative regulations (xingzheng
fagui), 57 or company Articles of Association in the course of performing company

Zhejiang Golden Bridge CLS 2003.

57

In this context, “law” and “administrative regulations” are terms of art, referring respectively to
norms promulgated by (i) the National People’s Congress or its Standing Committee, and (ii) the State
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duties, thereby causing damage to the company (gei gongsi zaocheng sunshi), and (ii)
“others” who violate the company’s lawful rights and interests, thereby causing
damage to the company.
2. Standing: In CLSs, initiating plaintiffs must collectively satisfy a one percent
shareholding requirement and must have held their shares for 180 days. There are no
comparable requirements for plaintiffs in LLCs.
3. Demand requirements: Before bringing an action against directors or senior
management, shareholders must first make a written demand on the board of
supervisors (or individual supervisors in case there is no supervisory board). Before
bringing an action against supervisors, shareholders must first make a demand on the
board of directors (or the executive director where there is no board of directors).
The plaintiff may proceed with the suit if (i) the demand is rejected, (ii) the demand is
not acted upon within thirty days, or (iii) the company would suffer irreparable
damage if the suit could not proceed immediately.
We discuss each element of the rule in more detail below, but first note the following two
contextual points about other new parts of the Company Law introduced in 2006: First, this new
action in law must be distinguished from a separate cause of action—similar in philosophy to
direct actions under the 1994 Company Law and the 1999 Securities Law —accruing directly to
shareholders for unlawful acts by directors or senior management violations (but not supervisory
board members) that “damage the interests of shareholders” (sunhai gudong liyi). 58 Second,
aside from the innovative derivative action embodied in Article 152, the 2006 Company Law is
noteworthy for its expanded list of permitted claims against directors, senior management, and
supervisory board members, as well as compensation obligations directed to the company as a
potential beneficiary, including breach of duty of care and duty of loyalty; 59 compensation for
corporate losses arising from board action that is in violation of law, administrative regulation,
the company Articles of Association, or shareholders’ resolutions (except where a director has
affirmatively dissented); 60 restitution of ill-gotten gains arising from specific duty of loyalty
breaches; 61 and compensation for losses arising from related-party transactions (apparently
whether or not disclosed and approved). 62 The derivative action added in 2006 is thus, at least
potentially, the procedural vehicle for a much expanded roster of substantive claims.
a. Standing
As noted above, there are special standing requirements for shareholders of companies
limited by shares. First, they must have held their shares for at least 180 consecutive days. The
statute does not stipulate that the shareholders bringing the demand must have been shareholders
Council. Regulations issued by central government ministries, for example, would not count as
“administrative regulations” (xingzheng fagui). See Keller (1994).
58

2006 Company Law, art. 153.

59

2006 Company Law, art. 148.

60

2006 Company Law, art. 113.

61

2006 Company Law, art. 149 (final paragraph).

62

2006 Company Law, art. 21.
17

at the time the cause of action arose and thus rejects the first prong of the U.S.-origin
“contemporary ownership rule” (“COR”). 63 It seems unlikely that the failure to specify the first
prong of the COR is an oversight; the 2003 Omnibus Regulation made this rule explicit, showing
that experts were aware of the issue. 64 An alternative rule proposed in the 2003 Omnibus
Regulation—that the six-month holding period be satisfied before the cause of action arises—
was also rejected, making the promulgated Article 152’s rule the least burdensome on plaintiffs
of those that were apparently under serious consideration.
Interestingly, Article 152 does not explicitly state that those initiating the suit must by
shareholders at the time of making the demand, although it would strain the statutory language to
read it any other way: after all, it states that “shareholders” must make the demand. It seems
fairly clear then that those initiating the suit must be shareholders when they bring the suit to
court; it is a basic rule of Chinese civil procedure that plaintiffs must have a direct interest in the
matter to be litigated, and it is hard to see what the interest of non-shareholders (other than
corporate creditors, of course) could be in a corporate recovery. And a separate interpretive
document issued by the Supreme People’s Court also suggests (albeit with less than perfect
clarity) that the holding period (discussed below) must extend to the date that the lawsuit is
brought. 65 In no case that we have reviewed for this chapter is the initiating plaintiff not a
shareholder at the time of the lawsuit.
Other civil law systems tend to require that a shareholder seeking to initiate a derivative
lawsuit (i) be a shareholder at the time of demand, and (ii) have been a shareholder for a set
period of time prior, ignoring the question of whether the demanding party was a shareholder at
the time the cause of action arose. For example, the Japanese Commercial Code requires only
that the demanding party have been a shareholder for six months prior to the demand; in
Germany the period is three months, and in Taiwan one year.
The second standing requirement for shareholders in CLSs is that they must collectively
own at least one percent of the CLS’ outstanding shares. There is no ownership threshold for
LLC shareholders. As with the holding period requirement, Article 152’s approach is more
plaintiff-friendly than the 2003 Omnibus Regulation, which duplicated the requirement for CLS
shareholders but imposed a ten percent requirement for LLC shareholders. By comparison, U.S.
state and Japanese corporate law systems do not stipulate a minimum percentage of holdings
before a demand may be made, although some U.S. states allow courts to order the posting of a
bond before the demand is made if the shareholding percentage (or value) is deemed too low.
Civil law systems do generally stipulate minimum shareholder percentages—for example, ten
percent in Germany and five percent in France. Influential adjacent systems such as Taiwan and
South Korea also provide for minimums: one percent and five percent respectively. As we note
in this chapter, the minimum shareholding requirement for CLSs threatened to defeat at least one
high-profile derivative action attempted after the 2006 Company Law. 66

63

See Delaware General Corporation Law, Section 327.

64

See Supreme People’s Court (2003b) (Omnibus Regulation), art. 44.

65

See Supreme People’s Court (2006) (hereinafter “1st Company Law Regulations”).

66

This is the Sanlian Shangshi 2009 case, which was finally accepted by the Shandong Higher
People’s Court (situs of the defendant controlling shareholder) in December 2009.
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b. Demand
The 2006 Company Law explicitly requires that a demand be made in writing to the
appropriate body. This requirement is a nod to the principle of exhaustion of intra-corporate
remedies, a concept we see raised frequently in Chinese pleadings and opinions. In reality,
however, intra-corporate remedies seem irrelevant; the only thing that can stop the plaintiff from
bringing suit is the corporation’s bringing suit itself. Unlike many other derivative lawsuit
mechanisms internationally, there is no room for the corporation to argue that a lawsuit would
not be in the corporation’s interest, or that it has obtained adequate non-litigious remedies for the
wrongdoing.
Although Article 152 improves on the 2003 Omnibus Regulation formulation by
generally specifying on whom demand must be made, 67 it does not specify on whom demand
should be made when seeking corporate action not against traditional fiduciaries, but against
non-insider “others”. One PRC writer opines that in such cases demand should be made first on
the Legal Representative, then on the board of directors, and finally on the board of supervisors,
in each case waiting thirty days for a response. 68 We see this view vindicated in one case. 69 In
general practice however, it seems that courts have not been so demanding when faced with
cases involving derivative claims against “others”. 70
Finally, we note that, read closely, the part of Article 152 which declares the “plaintiff
may proceed with the suit if ... the company would suffer irreparable damage if the suit could not
proceed immediately” does not appear to mean that demand may be excused (although that may
have been intended). As worded, the statute requires demand to be made even in such urgent
situations; what it allows to be waived is the waiting period. This strict interpretation, however,
does not seem to be how the Chinese courts normally understand the provision, as they regularly
permit demand waiver in “urgent” or “emergency circumstances.”
c. Defendants and Associated Causes of Action
One of the very important – and relatively unique—aspects of the Chinese derivative
action is that Article 152 divides potential defendants into two classes: insiders (directors, senior
managers, and supervisors) and “others” (taren), with the cause of action stated differently for
each class. This additional prong (corporate actions against “others”) is aimed at two situations:
(i) where a third party (but very often a related party) has injured the corporation and conflicted
corporate directors or the Legal Representative will not pursue remedies against the third party;
and (ii) where controlling shareholders abuse the corporate form to disadvantage or oppress
minority shareholders in the company as understood under Article 20(2) of the 2006 Company
Law. 71 Thus, as of 2006, China permits derivative actions in the limited “vertical” sense
67

See Supreme People’s Court (2003b) (Omnibus Regulation), art. 45.

68

See Lu (2007), p. 232.

69

See Tonghe Investment 2009 (demand on the board of directors was adequate).

70

See Huangshan Fenghua Real Estate 2009 (demand is excused because the company is
already in liquidation) and Beijing Golden Century 2009 (Article 152 is invoked with no mention
whatsoever of the demand requirement).
71

“Where a company shareholder abuses its shareholder rights and causes losses to the company
or the other shareholders, it shall be liable for compensation according to law.” This is the equivalent of
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(company v. corporate fiduciaries) and the “horizontal” sense (company v. controlling
shareholders for oppression or breach of controlling shareholders’ fiduciary duties). As noted in
the introduction to this chapter, given the capital structures and dysfunctions resulting from
China’s corporatization program, this ability to use the derivative lawsuit against controlling
shareholders for a remedy against oppression makes very good sense. This inclusion of third
parties is a significant expansion of the scope of possible defendants when compared with
Taiwan’s Company Law 72 and the Japanese Commercial Code. 73 It remains unclear, however,
why the 2006 Company Law drafters did not choose a unified cause of action for traditional
insiders and for “others.” Pursuant to Article 152, insiders may be sued when they have
damaged the company through breaches of law, administrative regulations, or the company’s
Articles of Association in the course of performing company duties (“Cause 1”); others may be
sued when they have damaged the company by violating its lawful rights and interests (“Cause
2”). If Cause 2 reaches acts not covered by Cause 1, why should insiders be exempt from it?
And yet the structure of Article 152 suggests they are not intended to be co-extensive.
There is ample evidence in our sample of the derivative lawsuit being used to go against
“others” – both contract parties with the injured company 74 and controlling shareholders. 75
Some cases – e.g., Shanghai Yuanji International 2006, Shanghai Taiwu Real Estate 2008, and
Beijing Puren Hospital 2009 – contain mixed claims, with third-party (but often related-party) or
controlling-shareholder defendants as well as defendants who are traditional fiduciaries. In these
cases, Chinese courts seem less sensitive to the differences in the required breaches and
damages.
V.

The Reality of Derivative Actions in the PRC After January 1, 2006 to Date

After January 1, 2006, and with the new derivative action mechanism in place, the
Chinese courts at all levels have accepted derivative pleadings and rendered judgments on them.

the Anglo-American common law actions for breach of (shareholders’) fiduciary duties and “oppression.”
Articles 20(1) & (3) of the 2006 Company Law also provide the basis for a traditional veil-piercing claim
where the claimants are third-party creditors of the corporation.
72

Taiwan Company Law, Article 214; defendants are limited to “directors” only.

73

The scope of defendants is limited to promoters, directors, supervisors, senior management and
liquidation committee members. Japanese Commercial Code, arts. 280 & 196.
74

See China Zhongqi Futures 2004-6, Chongqing Coal Mine 2006, Shanghai Decheng Real
Estate One 2006, Shanghai Decheng Real Estate Three, Shanghai Yuanji International 2006, Beijing
Puren Hospital 2009, and Tonghe Investment 2009.
75

See Zhejiang Golden Bridge CLS 2003 (public shareholder suit against a controlling 30%
government-backed shareholder), Henan Lianhua MSG Co., Ltd. (minority shareholder suit against
controlling shareholder of a publicly listed company),75 Shanghai Decheng Real Estate Two 2005 (suit
against a 50% Chinese-foreign joint venture partner to comply with its capitalization obligations),
Shanghai Peieryou 2006 (suit by 49% shareholder against a 51% corporate shareholder which has
deprived the company of a corporate opportunity), Shanghai Taiwu Real Estate 2008 (20% shareholder
cum supervisor sues two other shareholders holding 54% of the equity in a three-person LLC), and Beijng
Puren Hospital 2009 (defendant is a 90% shareholder ).
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a. Absence of CLS or Publicly-listed CLS-related Cases
Derivative suits involving CLSs, listed or unlisted, are striking by their virtually complete
absence. 76 This is a tragedy of sorts, as the derivative action was written into the 2006 Company
Law precisely to give minority shareholders in widely-held CLSs a way to bring claims against
corporate fiduciaries, controlling shareholders, and 3rd party obligors seemingly immune from
performance or enforcement by related party-dominated companies.
The only example we have found in the post-2006 period of a case involving a listed CLS
is one that is still sub judice. 77 Plaintiffs are attempting to sue derivatively on behalf of Sanlian
Shangshe Company, Ltd. against the former controlling shareholder of that listed company,
Sanlian Group. We feel relatively certain this is the only listed CLS-related case in the PRC
courts as of early 2010 because it is noted as such in the January 21, 2010 brief/request (filed by
the CLS itself) for transfer of the case away from the Shandong Higher People’s Court to the
Supreme People’s Court in Beijing. The request states, “[T]his case is the first shareholders’
representative suit [regarding] a listed company in China’s capital markets[.]” 78
There are several possible reasons of varying plausibility for this absence of CLS-related
cases. First, it is possible that CLSs are on the whole better managed and do not see the same
kind of abuses that give rise to the LLC cases. We find this explanation implausible and not
even remotely supported by the data issuing forth from the CSRC and its enforcement division.
Even if it were largely true, it could not account for almost complete absence of CLS-related
cases. Second, it is possible that the various obstacles to litigation and transaction costs that we
have described above weigh especially heavily on prospective plaintiffs in CLS-related
derivative suits. This explanation has much more plausibility. The formal law is tougher on
plaintiffs in CLS-related suits, and the practical barriers are also higher in the sense that the costbenefit analysis for a small shareholder in a CLS is much less likely to be favorable than for a
large minority shareholder in an LLC or a closely held CLS. Nevertheless, this reasoning is also
wanting as an explanation for the near-total absence of CLS-related suits. Surely occasionally
there could have been holders of large minority stakes in a CLS who wished to bring a derivative
suit (as there is in the Sanlian Shangshe 2009 case). A third possible explanation is that for some
reason CLS-related derivative suits are being settled invisibly to us in the shadow of the law, as it
were, either after filing (case filings are not reported nearly so well as case judgments) or even
without any filing at all. As with the second explanation, however, this one does not help us
understand why CLS-related suits should be so utterly absent from our sample. We cannot think
of any reasons why CLS-related suits should settle disproportionately early, relative to LLCrelated suits, unless perhaps the courts have a different attitude to them. Moreover, we surmise
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For the pre-January 1, 2006 period, we found only a few cases. See supra notes 54-56and
accompanying text. After 2006, we found only a few cases involving an unlisted CLS or larger numbers
of shareholders in an LLC (e.g., Nanchuan Chemical Industry 2006 (28 shareholders), Shanghai
Zhongjian Enterprise 2008 (40 shareholders), and Shizaishan Hengyuan 2009 (21 shareholders)). Of
course, these latter cases do not rise to the level of truly public companies owned by thousands of
shareholders.
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Sanlian Shangshe 2009. This case was accepted by the Shandong Higher People’s Court on
December 11, 2009 (after a large minority shareholder and one independent director were able to
convince 1.56% of the listed company’s shareholders to join the action). See Anon. (2009).
78

See Anon. (2010). As of the date of this paper, we have found no other cases.
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that settlement is probably easier in the close corporation context where all of the litigants have
better information, as contrasted with the information deficit traditionally experienced by small
shareholders in widely-held companies.
We are thus led to a fourth explanation: that courts do not accept CLS-related shareholder
litigation, whether on their own initiative or by instruction from superior levels of the judicial
bureaucracy. One of us has noted how the Chinese courts, on their own, will essentially stop
accepting politically or technically complex cases. 79 We have set forth above certain wellknown instructions from the Chinese court bureaucracy inhibiting or forbidding acceptance or
adjudication of cases involving large numbers of plaintiffs. One of us has described elsewhere
specific public instructions delivered to local level courts commanding them not to accept certain
kinds of public company corporate law cases (in one case, shareholder actions to invalidate
shareholder meeting resolutions at publicly-listed companies), 80 and an internal instruction
forbidding acceptance of all listed CLS-related cases. 81 We have both speculated elsewhere as to
the reasons for this rejectionist stance or these prohibitions from on high, and noted above the
keen hostility to judicial proceedings involving many parties. Suffice to say here the lack of
derivative lawsuits involving CLSs is a starkly evident fact.
b. “Straddling” Actions: 2006 Company Law Application to pre-2006
Transactions
As noted above, the 1st Company Law Regulations issued by the Supreme People’s Court
allowed judges to apply new rights from the 2006 Company Law in cases involving transactions
occurring before it came into effect. In our sample, where the facts occur before 2006, there is
not one court that rejects the subsequent derivative pleadings simply on those grounds. Indeed,
most such cases permit the derivative suit explicitly “with reference to” the 2006 statute. 82
c. Avoidance of Derivative Pleadings
Several cases in our sample show judicial competence, but an overly technical reading of
Article 152 which allows the courts involved to avoid the bother of implementing the derivative
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Howson (2010), pp. 332-3, 404 (regarding the nationwide refusal to accept or adjudicate cases
seeking enforcement of bank non-performing loans transferred to asset management companies and then
sold (at a discount) to commercial buyers).
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Howson (2010), p. 406 (allegedly to deter “vexatious shareholder litigation”).
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Howson (2010), p. 405(disclosed to the author by the President of one of Shanghai’s busiest
and most expert District People’s Courts).
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See the following cases: Jiangyin Xinghua 2005, Shanghai Shixing Real Estate 2005, Beijing
Aeronautical 2006, Beijing Taiqun Technology 2006, Chongqing Coal Mine 2006, Guangzhou Glass
2006, Liaoning Baotong Materials 2006, Nanchuan Chemical Industry 2006, Shanghai Decheng Real
Estate One 2006, Shanghai Decheng Real Estate Two 2005 and Shanghai Decheng Real Estate Three
2006, Shanghai Peieryou 2006, Shanghai Yuanji International 2006, Shanghai Taiwu Real Estate 2008,
Shunde Zhaoyu Electronic Hardware 2007, Hangzhou Wahaha 2007, Beijing Weishite 2009, and
Huangshan Fenghua Real Estate 2009.
There are only two slight deviations from this pattern: China Zhongqi Futures 2004-6 (May 2006
affirmation of pre-2006 lower-court judgment, but not referencing 2006 Company Law) and Guangzhou
Tianhe Scitech 2003 (November 2006 judgment in case brought in 2003, but not referencing 2006
Company Law).
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action. Judicial practice is certainly not uniform in this regard, as shown by the sometimes
equally aggressive acceptance of derivative pleadings described in the next section.
For instance, Shunde Zhaoyu Electronic Hardware 2007 saw a derivative action on a
“straddling” claim permitted by a district-level court overturned by the intermediate-level court
on appeal and re-hearing, because the initiating shareholder did not make a demand strictly in
accordance with Article 152. The court may have noticed that the complaining shareholder was
also the Legal Representative, and thus had the power to act for the company in bringing suit.
Nevertheless, we see the same denials of derivative lawsuits, even with apparently strong
underlying claims, because of the failure to “undertake legally-stipulated procedures”
(conforming demand) from courts around the country. 83 Beijing Dingyu Cable 2008
demonstrates a very unforgiving reading of the demand requirement, rejecting a derivative
lawsuit for failure to make a proper demand even though there was no corporate organ or actor in
existence that could have received the demand.
We distinguish these highly technical and prohibitive adjudications of derivative claims
from other cases that deny the derivative lawsuit on better grounds. In the Kunming Kangpaili
2009 case, for example, both the Kunming Wuhua District People’s Court and the Kunming
Intermediate People’s Court block derivative pleadings with strong underlying substantive
claims against a shareholder/Legal Representative of an LLC because the initiating parties are
so-called “hidden shareholders” (yinming gudong): contributors of capital to the LLC, but not
registered as such in public documents. Both Kunming courts decline to rule that a private
document reciting true shareholding interests should trump the publicly registered shareholding
interests, and find that even if the initiating plaintiffs are deemed “shareholders” in law, they
have not met the demand requirements of Article 152. This outcome seems reasonable, if only
to make commercial actors in China take public documents more seriously and to assert the
primacy of filing and procedural requirements under law.
In the Shanghai Tianguang 2009 case, the Shanghai Higher People’s Court properly
upholds a lower court dismissal of derivative pleadings for demand failure (called a “procedural
defect” and “failure to exhaust internal remedies”) but still allows plaintiffs a direct action
against co-shareholders (in substance, partners). This also seems a justified redirection of
derivative pleadings on behalf of the company to a more doctrinally appropriate arena.
d. Autonomy and Acceptance
While some courts have used technical readings of the law to avoid taking derivative
suits, others have gone out of their way to welcome them.
The “straddling” Beijing Aeronautical 2006 case – responding to a shareholder’s suit
regarding a 35% shareholder-controlled LLC that had already entered liquidation—shows a
remarkably aggressive use of the derivative lawsuit. Unlike Beijing Dingyu Cable 2008, this
case allows the suit even though there exists no corporate body that can receive the demand. 84
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See Shizaishan Hengyuan 2009 (Ningxia Autonomous Region), Kunming Kangpaili
Technology 2009 (Yunnan Province), Beijing Glory Project 2009, Beijing Weishite 2009 , and Beijing
Dingyu Cable 2008 (Beijing), and Shanghai Peieryou 2006 and Shanghai Tainguang Medical 2009
(Shanghai).
84

Courts allowed derivative suits in similar circumstances in Shanghai Ninghui 2008, Liaoning
Baotong Materials 2006 , and Huangshan Fenghua Real Estate 2009.
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Moreover, the court allows the derivative action to defeat a statute of limitations defense: the
alleged defaults occurred between1999-2002 and the case was initially accepted in 2004. The
court held boldly that because the derivative claim was not even available until January 1, 2006,
the two-year limitation period did not lapse until January 1, 2008.
In Tonghe Investment 2009, the Zhejiang Higher People’s Court permitted the derivative
lawsuit to go forward notwithstanding a possible technical defect in the related demand and
refusal: where the defendant was an “other” (i.e., not an insider) demand was made on, and
refusal issued in writing by, the board of directors, not the supervisory board. As we note above,
the 2006 Company Law is unclear in such cases as to where demand is to be made. A more
cautious court might have used the failure to make demand on the supervisory board as grounds
for rejecting the suit. The same tolerant approach to the precise addressee of the demand may be
seen in Beijing Puren Hospital 2009, a complex related-party “borrowings” case, where demand
served on the Legal Representative of the looted company was deemed sufficient to let the action
proceed.
In Henan Golden Mango Property 2009, the first- and second-instance courts allowed a
derivative action to proceed even though the complaining shareholder had not formally served
demand on the company that it sue a construction contractor. Both courts noted that originally
the company had sued on the contract, but had later withdrawn its action. This, said the secondinstance court, “may be seen as a refusal to bring the action” (ke shiwei jujue tiqi susong).
Courts have also liberally used the notion of urgent circumstances (Article 152 collapses
the thirty-day waiting period where “the company would suffer irreparable damage if the suit
could not proceed immediately”) to effectively excuse the demand requirement and to bring
otherwise non-conforming actions into court. 85
Indeed, in some cases the Chinese courts appear almost overly lax in accepting
derivative pleadings with no real requirements or analysis at all. In the only domestic corporate
litigation arising from the highly contentious Danone-Wahaha dispute 86 that went to judgment,
the Hangzhou Wahaha 2007 opinion rendered on December 11, 2007, the court did not even
comment on the derivative nature of the pleadings, and yet allowed the case to proceed and made
its own determination on the merits.
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See Weihai Yinghai 2008 (emergency situation), Beijing Dingyu Cable 2008 (no emergency
situation), Huangshan Fenghua Real Estate 2009 (company is in liquidation, so lack of demand not an
issue), Beijing Golden Century 2009 (company is not able to operate when ousted director, Legal
Representative and General Manager will not give up corporate chops and licenses in defiance of
unanimous shareholders’ resolution), and Beijing Puren Hospital 2009 (plaintiff shareholder is notified
that dominating shareholder and allegedly breaching fiduciary will apply for bankruptcy of the company
as a strategic response to the fiduciary lawsuit). See also the published views of a Sichuan Province
county-level judge confirming the availability of a direct action without demand in “emergency
circumstances” at Peng (2009).
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The dispute is described in Perkowski (n.d.) and Anon. (2009b).
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e. Technical Competence
PRC judicial officials have shown an impressive level of competence in understanding
and implementing the derivative mechanism. 87
A small number of “straddling” cases show lower level courts refusing derivative
pleadings before 2006 because there is no legal basis; these denials are then overturned on
appeal. The “straddling” Chongqing Coal Mine 2006 case exemplifies this. While the firstinstance court denied the derivative suit for lack of a legal basis, the second-instance court
reversed because the 2006 Company Law had since come into effect.
The Shanghai Kouweier 2008 case sticks closely to the derivative action offered in the
2006 Company Law, rejecting a “double derivative” lawsuit. The plaintiff was a shareholder in
a company that was the sole shareholder of the allegedly damaged entity; the court ruled that he
could not bring an action on behalf of a remote subsidiary. Regardless of policy, this is the
technically correct solution under Article 152, which does not seem to allow for the “double
derivative”/”multiple derivative” action. 88
There are also several cases applying the derivative lawsuit mechanism of Article 152 to
FIEs, or foreign-invested enterprise legal persons established under and governed by the separate
system of FIE laws and regulations. 89 In no case do we find a Chinese court refusing a
derivative lawsuit on the grounds that the relevant entity is an FIE and therefore not governed by
the Company Law.
A number of opinions show real technical competence in denying derivative pleadings
because the underlying injury is in reality suffered by one partner/shareholder, and not the
jointly-invested LLC. We see that in Beijing Jindao Hongping Advertising 2008, where firstinstance court (affirmed on appeal) dismisses somewhat spurious derivative pleadings in what is
really a dispute between 50/50 LLC shareholders, and where the company has already entered
into liquidation and there is no injury to the corporation. The Beijing Glory Project 2009 case
takes much the same line in denying derivative pleadings– formally for lack of conforming
demand on the company, but in our view really because the dispute is between two parties to a
real estate development contract where the money-investing partner sues the party holding the
development licence for defection. In each of these cases and several others in our sample, 90 the
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We do not discuss here the many cases where the derivative action is implemented without
issue, such as the Shanghai Zhongjian Enterprise 2008 case, where a mere 2.86% shareholder brings a
suit on behalf of the company against a negligent or disloyal Legal Representative on a loan, and the
Legal Representative is ordered to compensate the company for the loan.
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Other jurisdictions allow for such actions: Australia, New Zealand, Canada, and Singapore all
allow them by statute, and Hong Kong allows them as a matter of common-law extension of existing
derivative suit doctrine.
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See Beijing Taiqun Technology 2006, Beijing Weishite 2009, Liaoning Baotong Materials
2006, Shanghai Decheng Real Estate One 2006, Shanghai Decheng Real Estate Two 2005, Shanghai
Decheng Real Estate Three 2006, Shanghai Yuanji International 2006, Hangzhou Wahaha 2007,
Shanghai Kouweier 2008, Shanghai Ninghui 2008, and Weihai Yinghai 2008.
90

See, for example, Shanghai Tianguang Medical 2009 (Shanghai Higher People’s Court
overturns first-level denial of derivative lawsuit but then directs re-pleading based on plaintiff’s (not
company’s) injury).
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Chinese courts effectively channel what are pled as corporate and thus derivative lawsuits into
the more appropriate arena of direct claims between partners.
f. Difficulties Regarding Underlying Substantive Claims
Our research shows that while Chinese courts may increasingly accept derivative
pleadings, they can encounter difficulties in adjudicating the underlying substantive claims.
Indeed, only rarely do we see really robust application of the underlying substantive claim
against a traditional corporate fiduciary. One rare example is the Beijing Xiankou Food and
Beverage 2009 case, where a Legal Representative who had misappropriated corporate revenues
was found to have violated the “duty to properly use company assets” (zhengdang shiyong
gongsi caichan de yiwu), which was in turn explicitly deemed a part of the 2006 Company Law
Article 148 and 148 duties. 91
Far more common are case opinions where Chinese judges fumble or avoid adjudication
of the underlying substantive claims. For example, in Nanchuan Chemical Industry 2006, the
court allowed a derivative lawsuit even though the acts complained of occurred before 2006. But
it rejected the underlying substantive claim against some of the defendant directors and officers
of the company, reasoning (bizarrely, in our view) that “… even though the other defendants
may have been in breach of their duty of care, 92 the breach of that duty and resulting liability to
the company [for damages] is a separate legal relationship (lingwai de falü guanxi).”
We see a similar misstep on the substantive claim in the Weihai Yinghai 2008 case, at
least at the first level of adjudication. There, the court accepts derivative pleadings, but then
finds the actions of the defendant as not actionable either because they are authorized by a
corporate resolution (use of the company chop) or because they “pertain to issues of the
company’s internal administration” (shuyu gongsi neibu guanli shiyi) (disclosure to company
shareholders of financial records).
The same problem is apparent again in Huangshan Fenghua Real Estate 2009. In that
case, the Anhui provincial-level court affirms the lower court’s allowance of the derivative
action, but also upholds its dismissal of the underlying cause of action because it relates—in the
words of the defendant’s brief—“merely to internal shareholder disputes” (jinjin shi gudong
neibu jiufen), and because the underlying contracts challenged as harmful to the company are
subject only to the principles of contract formation described in the PRC Contract Law. The
opinion goes so far as to say that the derivative action is applicable only to asserted breaches of
Article 150 of the Company Law by corporate directors and senior management. Thus, when
faced with nine land sales contracts at below-market value entered into by the company already
in liquidation as represented by the defendant, the court refuses to look at potential breaches by
the defendant and instead affirms the validity of the contracts under the PRC Contract Law.
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See also Shanghai Kouweier 2008, where the court dismisses the “double derivative” action but
then nonetheless addresses the underlying breach of duty of care.
92

The opinion uses both “qinmian yiwu” from the 2006 Company Law and “zhuyi yiwu” – a form
used in Chinese-language academic writing and Taiwanese corporate law.
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We find a number of cases where the courts accept the derivative action but seem
reluctant to find fiduciary duty violations. 93 Shanghai XXX Electric 2009 shows an inability to
apply fiduciary duty law colored by misunderstanding of the logic behind the derivative action.
The court rejects the underlying cause of action on grounds which include the failure of the
plaintiff to show losses by the company, and then proceeds to subvert the rationale behind the
already-accepted derivative pleadings, noting that “the lent funds can be recovered via a lawsuit
by the company and other methods against director Zhang [the defendant].” The court fails to
understand that the defendant director, as executive director and Legal Representative of the
LLC, can block the company entirely from seeking this remedy.
g. Confusion Between Derivative and Representative Lawsuits
In some cases we see overly aggressive and technically flawed application of the
derivative lawsuit, or the use of Article 152 in situations that do not warrant it. One good
example of this phenomenon is the Beijing Huayuya Real Estate 2009 case, in which the court
invokes Article 152 to force a dissident shareholder to fulfill the terms of a shareholders’
resolution. In that case, a father shareholder in a three-shareholder LLC dies, whereupon his
72% interest in the LLC passes to his wife and three of his children, and all of the shareholders
resolve to appoint the surviving wife as Legal Representative and executive director of the LLC.
The two pre-existing shareholders (the deceased father’s child and someone probably his or her
spouse) do not implement the shareholders’ resolution, and take no action to register the
surviving wife’s appointment as the new Legal Representative and executive director. The new
shareholders sue, in their own names and to remedy injury to themselves, to cause performance
of the shareholders’ resolution. In allowing the suit to proceed under Article 152, the court
states, “Shareholders who suffer injury to their rights can bring a shareholders’ representative
suit (quanli shou sun de gudong keyi tiqi gudong daibiao susong).” This is incorrect as applied
to this case. If the court really means “representative suit,” then it is wrong because the plaintiff
shareholders do not seek to represent any other shareholders. If it means “derivative suit” under
Article 152, it is equally wrong because the shareholders are not suing over an injury to the
company. 94
h. Judge-made Direct Litigation Right for Supervisors
Our review of cases shows an interesting example of judicial initiative: the judge-made
creation of a legal right for supervisors to sue on behalf of the injured company without any
prodding from a shareholder demand. 95 We speculate that PRC courts have created this direct
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See, among others, the following cases with alleged duty of loyalty breaches: Shanghai
Decheng Real Estate 2006, Beijing Yuannian Culture 2009, Beijing Wanpeng Management 2010,
Shanghai Ninghui 2008, and Shanghai Yuanji International 2006.
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See the same misconception in the Dongfang Construction Group 2009 case.
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See Shanghai Shixing Real Estate 2005 (failing to set forth any legal or statutory basis for this
power, other than to say that the supervisor plaintiff “has the power according to Company Law
stipulations” and that such a lawsuit “conforms to stipulations of law”), Beijing Kejie Window 2009
(stating that the plaintiff need not specifically use Article 152’s derivative action mechanism because he
is both a shareholder and a supervisory board member), Shanghai Taiwu Real Estate 2008 (permitting a
24% shareholder in an LLC to sue two co-shareholders holding in the aggregate 54% “as a supervisor
acting for the company”), and Beijing Xiangkou Food and Beverage 2009 (seeming to hold that
supervisors have not only the right but the duty to sue when management is conflicted).
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litigation right in order to avoid technical obstacles to implementation of the derivative lawsuit
mechanism, while allowing themselves to invoke its terms and spirit. Importantly, this direct
right of action seems only effective with respect to closely-held LLCs and when the office of
supervisor is coupled with a shareholder interest.
i. Allocation of Court Fees and “Loser Pays All”
Court fees in our sample of cases are generally allocated to the loser both before and after
January 1, 2006. Unfortunately, the case reports we have reviewed do not generally reveal how
attorneys’ fees are allocated between the parties, although one imagines the case opinions would
describe any variance from the alleged norm in Chinese litigation—that each party pays its own
attorneys’ fees. In the derivative action context, this would mean that initiating shareholders
would have to pay their own attorneys’ fees.
Of the forty-four analyzed cases listed in Appendix 1 of this chapter, eighteen adhere to
the “loser pays all” principle, nineteen are silent on the court fee allocation question, and seven
show a variation from the alleged “loser pays” norm. Only one case in our sample appears to
internalize the logic of the derivative action: Beijing Tonghua Online 2009. In that case,
shareholder plaintiffs bringing suit on behalf of the company are successful in derivative
pleadings, but unsuccessful on the underlying claim of breach of duty of loyalty, and so the
“third party” (the company that has allegedly been injured) is assessed 8,109 yuan in court
fees. 96 Although the loser still pays, the “loser” is deemed to be the company, not the
shareholders who initiated the derivative claim on behalf of the company.
There are some cases going the other way. 97 Unfortunately, the case reports and opinions
do not provide sufficient data for us to know why these occasional departures from the “loser
pays all” principle occur. We can speculate that departures are more likely to occur when a
plaintiff has won a significant damage award from defendant(s), as we see in the Shanghai
Shixing Real Estate 2005 case, where the defendant was ordered to pay 272,000 yuan back to the
company.
VI.

Critique of Article 152 and Reform Suggestions

The preceding sections have noted various problems with the Article 152 mechanism. In
this section, we summarize our critiques and suggestions for reform.
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The same logic is vindicated but in a case which does not adhere to the “loser pays all”
principle, Chongqing Coal Mine 2006, where the plaintiff shareholders are successful in the derivative
action, but the LLC whose interest is being protected is assigned almost one third of the court costs.
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These include (in chronological order): Shanghai Shixing Real Estate 2005 (supervisor
successfully sues on behalf of company but is assessed 96% of court fees), Chongqing Coal Mine 2006
(plaintiff shareholders successful in derivative action, but the LLC whose interest is being protected is
assessed one-third of court fees), Shanghai Decheng Real Estate Three 2006 (partially successful
plaintiff/appellant and company itself pay part of court fees), Beijing Dingyu Cable 2008 (derivative
action denied, yet court orders return of the plaintiff’s litigation fee deposit), Weihai Yinghai 2008
(successful plaintiff assessed 348,000 yuan in court costs, losing defendant assessed only 200 yuan),
Beijing Kejie Window 2009 (initiating supervisor/shareholder permitted to sue on behalf of company, but
ordered to pay 0.75% of the first-instance court’s fees and 33.7 % of the second –instance court’s fees),
and Beijing Xiangkou Food and Beverage 2009 (initiating supervisor cum shareholder pays 2,389 yuan in
court costs; losing defendant assessed only 171 yuan).
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First, the Company Law should state clearly that the initiating shareholder of a derivative
action must be a shareholder of the affected company at the time the suit is brought.
Second, the Company Law currently lacks any standards for, or even a concept of,
justified refusal by the board or supervisory board to satisfy the demand. Read literally, the
statute makes the demand requirement virtually meaningless, because if the company does not
bring suit upon demand the shareholder may always do so. No doubt the drafters were
concerned about structural bias and demand futility when boards are conflicted. Yet making
demand irrelevant, or not allowing a board of supervisors or directors to make a justified, goodfaith, refusal is no answer, and may result in abuse of the derivative lawsuit. In addition, the
badly-drafted mechanism does not acknowledge the supervisors’ and directors’ duties under
Article 148 to act in the best interests of the corporation, much less any judicial role in evaluating
whether their refusal of the demand conforms to that duty. The options for statutory remediation
here are many, including a mandated “independent committee” or an affirmative basis for
judicial evaluation of a board refusal (or shareholder allegation of demand futility), and
recognition of something akin to the directors’ “business judgment.” One Supreme People’s
Court judge has made just this suggestion: “[W]e must stipulate effective conditions for any
resolution [by the board refusing demand]: first, that the resolution is conditioned on prior
appropriate investigation [of the claim] by the supervisory board or the independent directors;
second, that the directors who vote on the resolution do not include defendants in the derivative
action; and third, that the resolution be made in the best interests of the corporation (weile gongsi
de zuidade liyi).” 98 The third prong suggested for justified refusal implies significant
participation by the judiciary in evaluating whether the refusal is in conformity with the
directors’ fiduciary duties, raising the question of whether Chinese judges, who are unlikely to
have any significant business experience, are up to the task.
Third, the Company Law should stipulate upon whom demand must be made when the
action demanded is against a non-insider “other.” Failure to do so risks allowing conservative
judicial institutions to stymie meritorious derivative lawsuits on a technicality.
Fourth, the Company Law should clarify the exact effect of “urgent” or “emergency”
circumstances upon demand and the stipulated 30-day waiting period. Is, as most PRC courts
rule, demand itself excused, or is it just the 30-day period which is eliminated?
Last in the line of specific critiques, Article 152 makes a distinction between the wrong
on the company that triggers the derivative action: insiders may be sued when they have
damaged the company through breaches of law, administrative regulations, or the company’s
Articles of Association in the course of performing company duties, while “others” may be sued
when they have damaged the company by violating its lawful rights and interests. We can think
of no good reason for this difference.
More generally, we question the idea of minimum shareholding requirement for CLSs.
This makes little sense in the PRC where there remains such concentrated ownership in publiclylisted CLSs, and so many temptations for controlling shareholder malfeasance or minority
shareholder oppression. It makes even less sense where there are so many other mechanisms
working against minority shareholders bringing what, after all, is a corporate claim (and must be
recognized as such during adjudication). There is a persistent (and we believe mistaken) sense in
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Jin (2008), p. 423.
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the Chinese discourse that the required minimum is tied to the notion that a derivative lawsuit is
in fact a “representative” lawsuit, and therefore requires a minimum number of shareholders to
“represent” the interests of all or most of the other shareholders. 99 This is a radical
misunderstanding of the derivative action: a derivative lawsuit is a corporate claim, merely
initiated by one or more shareholders to get around the structural block presented by those who
control the corporation and are unwilling to bring suit. In addition, even if there is to be a
minimum threshold, the 1% level may well be so high as to discourage otherwise meritorious
actions by minority shareholders in widely-held companies. 100
PRC jurisdictional rules generally require derivative lawsuits to be heard where the
company has its headquarters (zhuyao banshichu jigou). 101 For example, the Sanlian Shanghshe
2009 case, China’s first and perhaps only post-2006 publicly-listed CLS case, was docketed (li
an) at the Shandong Provincial Higher People’s Court, the situs of the defendant controlling
shareholders. This hurts derivative actions, because the insiders of the corporatized state-owned
enterprises being sued—or the controlling shareholders of such entities—are often locally
powerful government and Party figures who have significant political, administrative, and fiscal
control over the local court system.
With respect to the role of the judiciary in evaluating fact and law questions, the language
in the statute about “irreparable damage to the interests of the company” (i.e., an emergency)
strongly implies some kind of real evaluation role for the PRC judiciary, unless shareholders are
simply to plead these conclusions and have them accepted in all cases. We note travesties like
the 2008 Beijing Dingyu Cable 2008 case, where derivative pleadings are denied on the theory
that there is no emergency situation because the company has already been fully looted. And yet
we also see a good number of other opinions where an emergency is found and demand
effectively waived.
In addition, the system does not currently take account of demands by shareholders who
have previously ratified the allegedly offending actions under conditions of full disclosure, and
who then opportunistically turn around and initiate derivative lawsuits protesting those actions.
In each of these examples, the only body that can properly evaluate the fact and law questions is
the judiciary. Yet it remains to be seen if Chinese courts have the requisite competence and
autonomy to make the required evaluations in such complex situations. They might benefit from
stronger, more bright-line rules.
The 2006 Company Law and the current Civil Procedure Law remain unclear on the legal
position of the company in the newly-authorized derivative lawsuit. The classic AngloAmerican derivative action is in fact two suits at equity, one of which is a claim by the company
as the “real party plaintiff” against those alleged to have injured it. This structure is important,
because it directs any compensation or damages to the company and not to individual
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For example, PRC Supreme People’s Court Justice Jin Jianfeng justifies minimum shareholder
percentages because they “ensure that the plaintiff is sufficiently representative.” See Jin (2008), p. 418.
Of course, in a true derivative action, the plaintiff is the company and is not “represented” by anyone, and
certainly not by shareholders (who have their own “direct” claims to pursue).
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Tang (2008), p. 145. The fear of abusive strike suits brought just for their settlement value
may well be overblown. See Zhang (2008), pp. 549-50.
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See Jin (2008), p. 423.
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shareholders who may have distinct interests in the litigation. Civil law systems handle this
somewhat differently, and again in a way that may be tied closely to the understanding that
derivative lawsuit are really “representative” lawsuits. The Japanese system, for instance, holds
that the corporation is not a necessary formal party to a derivative lawsuit, and that the court may
at its own discretion reject the company’s application to join or include the corporation in the
action where the company is unwilling to be joined. The 2006 Company Law of China makes no
explicit provision for the formal role of the corporation, and thus judges are left to wonder if the
company in a well-pleaded derivative action is (i) not a party, (ii) the plaintiff (with, or alone and
to the exclusion of, the shareholders taking the initiative) or (iii) some kind of involuntary “third
party” (di san ren), a role permitted under the PRC’s Law on Civil Procedure but only on
voluntary application. 102 One influential Supreme People’s Court judge asserted in 2008, for
example, that the company should be either “the name plaintiff” or the “third party” (di san
ren). 103 Thus, efforts should be made in statute (either the Company Law or the Civil Procedure
Law) to clarify the position of the company as the formal plaintiff. This would help derivative
lawsuits on a number of fronts, from cost allocation (including up-front payment of attorneys
fees and court costs by the usually richer company) and financial incentives, to adjudication of
harm and causality, and it would go a long way to clearing up the evident confusion rooted in the
term “representative lawsuit” with its implication that the company is being “represented” by the
shareholders. The company should be the direct, name, plaintiff, and thus the lawsuit should be
pursued in the company’s interest.
We are also concerned about the position of shareholders who are not part of the demand
on the company. If it is a true derivative claim, then they are affected equally by the success or
failure of the company’s claim. But how are such other shareholders to be protected against
colluding shareholders who get control of the Article 152 lawsuit (i.e., those who are first to
make a demand)? One idea is to give other non-demanding shareholders the right to join in
control of the suit if it proceeds. 104 Another idea is to provide a statutory basis for courts to
prohibit settlements between defendants and the shareholders running the derivate lawsuit. 105
Rules on derivative actions in foreign jurisdictions often restrict such settlements without court
approval. 106 China’s current civil procedure norms stipulate no such restriction. That is why the
pre-2006 sub-national Opinions permitting derivative lawsuits stipulated precisely such a
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Civil Procedure Law, Article 56(1). Supreme People’s Court judge Jin Jianfeng acknowledges
this technical problem. See Jin (2008), p. 421.
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See Jin (2008), p. 415.
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This has been suggested by Supreme People’s Court judge Jin Jianfeng, although his
rationales— first, that this will enable better investigation of defendant malfeasance, and second, that the
lawsuit be more “representative”— miss the key concern, which is the prevention of collusion. See Jin
(2008), p. 420.
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In the one case in our sample that is settled (while on appeal before the Supreme People’s
Court), Tonghe Investment 2009, the case reports also focus on the caution that must be exercised with
respect to any settlement reached in a derivative action, given the risk that the controlled company will
agree to terms that are disadvantageous to it.
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See, for example, Fed. R. Civ. P. 23.1. The Chinese Law on Civil Procedure provides only
affirmation of the ability to settle suits, at Article 51.
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constraint 107 and why one authoritative Supreme People’s Court Justice has urged that
settlements in derivative actions be permitted only with court approval. 108
Finally, given the existing obstacles to the financing of derivative actions in China, we
believe it would be unwise for China to impose further obstacles, such as requiring that
demanding shareholders post a bond as a pre-condition to bringing a derivative suit. 109 Indeed,
Article 47 of the 2003 Omnibus Regulation reproduced one mechanism familiar from Article
267(6) of the Japanese Commercial Code designed to inhibit nuisance suits: providing that if
derivative lawsuit defendants can offer evidence that plaintiffs were suing in “bad faith” the
court could, upon application of the defendants, require plaintiffs to post security for defendants’
reasonable litigation expenses. This would be counter-productive in the PRC, even if included in
some misguided attempt to create an “international (best) standard” derivative lawsuit.
VII.

Conclusion

In today’s China, the derivative lawsuit is suddenly viable and increasingly brought to the
courts throughout the country. It is unquestionably a step forward in the development of China’s
corporate governance that courts are actually hearing derivative suits despite the technical,
institutional, economic, and political obstacles we have identified in this chapter. Given the
courts’ preference for specific instructions over general statutory authorizations, this is all the
more remarkable because the Supreme People’s Court has not yet promulgated implementing
rules specifically governing the derivative lawsuit.
Our study of cases shows that the courts will permit derivative pleadings to overcome
structural obstacles inherent in the corporate form, and sometimes quite aggressively, as seen in
the derivative actions permitted without any statutory basis, the use of a 1994 Supreme People’s
Court document facially limited to foreign-party-controlled joint ventures as a legal basis for
other derivative suits, the many straddling actions applying the post-2006 derivative action to
pre-2006 transactions, the abundant use of the derivative lawsuit “horizontally” against “others”
that include controlling shareholders, and the post-2006 allowance for a supervisor’s direct right
of action to sue on behalf of the company (at least when the supervisor is also a shareholder).
These judgments are strong evidence that the technical defects we have highlighted have not
seriously constrained the development or implementation of the derivative action in China, at
least with respect to LLCs. In addition, the developments and specific jurisprudence discussed in
this chapter also show the courts’ increasing cognizance of, and comfort wielding, complex
substantive corporate law doctrines which underpin the derivative lawsuit vehicle (including
fiduciary duties, at least as far as the duty of loyalty is concerned). These observations bode well
for the elaboration and strengthening of China’s corporate governance regime and the role of the
courts in applying corporate law.
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See, for example, Shanghai HLPC (2003) (Shanghai Opinion): “[W]hen the parties raise a
settlement proposal in the course of the litigation, and the People’s Court determines that the proposed
settlement will harm the interests of other shareholders of the company, then the settlement should not be
approved and the litigation should continue.”
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Jin (2008), p. 425.
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See the suggestion of Supreme People’s Court judge Jin Jianfeng at Jin (2008), pp. 423-24,
and Tsinghua University law professor Tang Xin’s pre-emptive worry on the same score at Tang (2008),
p. 146.
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On the other hand, some of the defects and obstacles we discuss in this chapter will
provide an easy excuse for courts to avoid hearing derivative suits, thereby leaving certain
corporate actors and contract parties unaccountable. Most importantly, we have found almost no
cases involving listed or even unlisted CLSs. We have speculated above on the reasons for this
absence. Whatever the reasons, it remains true that the virtual absence of CLS-related cases is a
misfortune for corporate law and corporate governance in the PRC. For the rapidly expanding
number of CLSs and their minority shareholder investors, the derivative suit mechanism of
Article 152 is simply not working, or not being permitted to work.
A further problem we observe is that even when the derivative action is successfully
implemented, some courts continue to remain wary or uncomprehending of the underlying
corporate law doctrines, especially the duty of care. We found virtually no cases involving the
duty of care, and other research we have done in non-derivative suit cases yields similar results.
Indeed, we found one shocking case which liberally permitted a derivative action but then
abandoned application of the substantive fiduciary claim because the latter was deemed part of a
“separate legal relationship.” If courts are unwilling or unable to enforce a duty of care, then an
important element of the rationale behind allowing derivative suits will remain unrealized.
In sum, China’s mechanism for derivative lawsuits remains insufficient to support good
corporate governance and accountability for managers and controlling shareholders in widelyheld CLSs. It is not wholly insufficient, or so weak that we would advise abandoning the effort
to improve the associated substantive law and to develop the institutions needed to apply it.
Indeed, the mechanism’s mere existence is in some sense helping judicial institutions act more
autonomously and with greater power in Chinese society. On the corporate governance side, and
particularly in the absence of other remedies for shareholder oppression, it is a vital tool for
shareholders in both CLSs and LLCs. We believe the derivative lawsuit has a future in China.
We also believe, however, that at present it can only supplement, and not replace, state
regulatory institutions in the policing of corporate governance and insider action. In China today
it remains state regulatory institutions, and not courts, that are likely to have the necessary
independence from local political and economic interests, as well as technical expertise, to
enforce accountability and expanded legal rights.
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Appendix I: Cases
Note: Case citations marked with an asterisk indicate cases for which we have not obtained and
reviewed judicial opinions, but relied on secondary reports.
Beijing Aeronautical 2006: Lin Yu v. Aeronautical New Concept Science and Technology re:
Beijing Aeronautical City Tongzhi Nengka Engineering Company Limited (Beijing Municipal
Haidian District People’s Court (2006) hai min chuzi No. 08927).
Beijing Dingyu Cable 2008: Zhang Ke v. Zhang Chen re: Beijing Dingyu Special Type Electric
Cable Company Limited (Beijing Municipal Haidian District People’s Court (2008) hai min
chuzi No. 23873).
Beijing Glory Project 2009: Beijing Longsheng Real Estate Development Company Limited v.
China National Minorities Periodicals re: Beijing Gelairui National Minorities Culture Media
Center Company Limited (Beijing No. 1 Intermediate People’s Court (2008) yi zhong min chu zi
No. 9701; on appeal Beijing Higher People’s Court (2009) gao min zhong zi No. 2325).
Beijing Golden Century 2009: Beijing Municipal Houlu Agricultural Labor Commercial
Company and Beijing Municipal Shunyi Houlu Cement Components v. Xu Liansheng re: Beijing
Golden Century Agricultural Development Company Limited (Beijing Municipal Shunyi District
People’s Court (2009) shun min chu zi No. 75; on appeal Beijing No. 2 Intermediate People’s
Court (2009) er zhong min zhong zi No. 08234).
Beijing Huayuya Real Estate 2009: Chen X, Zhu X, Zhu 1 and Zhu 2 v. Beijing Municipal
Huayuya Real Estate Development Company Limited, Zhu 3 and Li X (Beijing Municipal
Dongcheng District People’s Court (2009) dong min chu zi No. 4349).
Beijing Jindao Hongping Advertising 2008: Guo Hong v. Fu Ping re: Beijing Jindao
Hongping Advertising Company Limited (Beijing Municipal Haidian District People’s Court
(2008) hai min chu zi No. 7380; on appeal Beijing No. 1 Intermediate People’s Court (2008) yi
zhong min zhong zi No. 14669) .
Beijing Kejie Window 2009: Hao Ling v. Wang Qiyan re: Beijing Kejie Meimen Window
Company Limited (Beijing Municipal Haidian District People’s Court (2007) hai min chuzi No.
11373; on appeal Beijing No. 1 Intermediate People’s Court (2009) yi zhong zhongzi No. 5142).’
Beijing Puren Hospital 2009: Wu Yongjian v. Xu Wenxing and Zhu Yuxiang re: Beijing Puren
Hospital Administration Company Limited (Beijing Municipal Shunyi District People’s Court
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(2009) shun min chu zi No. 1065; on appeal Beijing No. 2 Intermediate People’s Court (2009) er
zhong min zhong zi No. 11811).
Beijing Taiqun Technology 2006: Hantang Jicheng Co., Ltd. (Taiwan) v. Chen Shihu, Lin
Cangmin and Gan Wenqi re: Beijing Taiqun Technology Company Limited (unidentified Beijing
Municipal District People’s Court (after 2003); on appeal Beijing No. 2 Intermediate People’s
Court (after 2005)).
Beijing Taishan 2000: Described in Zhang & Wang (2004).*
Beijing Tonghua Online 2009: Su Zhen and Han Fang v. Rong Chunming re: Beijing Tonghua
Jinqiu Shangwang Company Limited (Beijing Municipal Haidian District People’s Court (2009)
hai min chu zi No. 32426).
Beijing Wanpeng Management 2010: Liu Bin v. Li Zhanjun re: Beijing Wanpeng Property
Management Company Limited (Beijing Municipal Haidian District People’s Court (2009) hai
min chu zi No. 13158; on appeal Beijing No. 1 Intermediate People’s Court (2010) yi zhong min
zhong zi No. 1099).
Beijing Weishite 2009: Jiang Zhiling and Jiang Zhijun v. Shen Lusui re: Beijing Weishite
Development Consulting Company Limited (Beijing No. 2 Intermediate People’s Court (2009) er
zhong min chu zi No. 09350).
Beijing Xiangkou Food and Beverage 2009: Wen Jianguo v. Zhao Limei re: Beijing Xiangkou
Xiaojing Nanjinjia Food and Beverage Company Limited (Beijing Xuanwu District People’s
Court (2009) xuan min chu zi No. 2625.
Beijing Yuannian Culture 2009: Zhang Wei v. Wang Long re: Beijing Yuannian Culture
Development Company Limited (Beijing Municipal Fengtai District People’s Court (2009) feng
min chu zi No. 02775).
China Zhongqi Futures 2004-6: Suzhou New Development Investment Company Limited &
Yankuang Group Company v. Qingdao Qianxi Hongda Sports Recreation Company Limited,
Sichuan Hongda (Group) Company Limited, Sichuan Hongda Ltd., Co. re: China Zhongqi
Futures Broker Company Limited (Beijing Higher People’s Court (2004) gao min chu zi No.
1287; affirmed on appeal (after withdrawal of original defendants’ appeal) Supreme People’s
Court (2006) min er zhongzi No. 56).

35

Chongqing Coal Mine 2006: X. Power Enterprise General Company and Y. Enterprise
Company Limited v. Deng, Cooperative Mine, He and Z. Mining Company Limited (Chongqing
No. 2 Intermediate People’s Court (2005) yu er zhong fa min zhu zi No. 28; on appeal Chongqing
Higher People’s Court (2006) [judgment identifier not provided]).
Dongfang Construction Group 2009: Chen Ju v. Dongfang Construction Group Company
Limited (Zhejiang Province Zhuji City District People’s Court (2009) shao zhu shang chu zi No.
4058).
Guangzhou Glass 2006: Lin Xiangyang, Lin Luqiang & Lin Xiongjie v. Lin Yijun, Guangzhou
Municipal Lan An Glass Company Limited & Jia Baozhen re: Guangzhou Lan An Glass
Company Limited (Guangzhou Municipal Tianhe District People’s Court (2005) tian fa min er zi
No. 2493; on appeal Guangdong Province Guangzhou Intermediate People’s Court (2006) sui
zhong fa min san zhongzi No. 1).
Guangzhou Tianhe Scitech 2003: Guangzhou Municipal Tianhe Science and Technology Park
Construction Company Limited v. Guangdong Zhujiang Investment Company Limited, Liao
Ruoqing, Nambour Properties Limited re: Guangzhou Tianhe Science and Technology Park
Enterprise Management Company Limited (Guangdong Province Higher People’s Court (2003)
yue gao fa min chuzi No. 5).
Hangzhou Wahaha 2007: Jinja Investments Pte. Ltd. v. Zong Qinghou re: Hangzhou Wahaha
Beverages Company Limited (Xinjiang Production and Construction Corps, No. 8 Agricultural
Division Intermediate People’s Court (2007) bing ba min yi chu zi No. 17).
Henan Golden Mango Property 2009: Lu Tong v. Henan Longxiang Construction Engineering
Company Limited re: Henan Golden Mango Property Company Limited (Zhengzhou Municipal
Guancheng Hui Minority District People’s Court (2007) guan min er chu zi No. 257; on appeal
Henan Provincial Zhengzhou Municipal Intermediate People’s Court (2009) zheng min er zhong
zi No. 718).
Henan Lianhua MSG 2004: Described in Anon (2004).*
Huangshan Fenghua Real Estate 2009: Shi Jianjun v. Qian Guoli, Qian Guojun, Zhou Guojin,
Xu Xuejun, Zheng Dongsheng, and Shi Huifang re: Huangshang Municipal Fenghua Real Estate
Development Company Limited (Huangshan Municipal Intermediate People’s Court (2004)
huang zhong fa min er chu zi No. 21, and after remand (2005) huang zhong fa min er chu zi No.
24; on appeal Anhui Provincial Higher People’s Court (2009) wan min er zhong zi No. 0163).
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Jiangyin Xinghua 2005: Jiangyin Municipal Shunxing Chemical Industry Machinery Company
Limited v. Lin Zhen [Lim Chin]and Lin Jingzhi re: Jiangyin Xingyi Particle Chemical Industry
Company Limited (Jiangsu Province Wuxi Muncipality Intermediate People’s Court (2005) xi
min san chu zi No. 0016-2).
Kunming Kangpaili Technology 2009: Qian Qingwen and Chen Xiaobing v. Gao Weiyong re:
Kunming Kangpaili Technology Company Limited (Kunming Municipal Wuhua District
People’s Court (2008) wu fa min san chu zi No. 253; on appeal Kunming Intermediate People’s
Court (2009) kun min wu zhong zi No. 49).
Liaoning Baotong Materials 2006: Fujian Yatong New Materials Science and Technology Co.,
Ltd. v. Liu Daomin, Huang Shanshan & Shenyang Fugu New Materials Pipes Company Limited
re: Liaoning Baotong New Materials Science and Technology Company Limited (Liaoning
Provincial Shenyang Municipal Intermediate People’s Court (2006) shen zhong min si quan chu
zi No. 1).
Nanchuan Chemical Industry 2006: Li Xiaozhong and 28 other shareholders v. Xiao Wuyong
& Zhang Dingzhong re: Nanchuan Municipal Hardware Infrastructure Electric Chemical
Industry Company Limited (Chongqing Nanchuan City [District] People’s Court (2006)
nanchuan fa min chuzi No. 538).
San Jiu Pharmaceutical 2002: Described in Deng (2005), p. 371; Wu (2003), pp. 83-6; Chen,
Firth & Gao (2005), pp. 481-2; and China Securities Regulatory Commission (2002).*
Sanlian Shangshe 2009: Described in Anon (2009).*
Shanghai Decheng Real Estate One 2006: Pinghai Development Company Limited v. Shanghai
Zhongxing Group Zhencheng Real Estate Company Limited re: Shanghai Decheng Real Estate
Company Limited (Shanghai No.1 Intermediate People’s Court (2005) hu yi zhong min wu
(shang) chu zi No. 127; on appeal Shanghai Higher People’s Court (2006) hu gao min si zi No.
55).
Shanghai Decheng Real Estate Two 2005: Pinghai Development Company Limited v. Shanghai
Zhongxing Group Zhencheng Real Estate Company Limited re: Shanghai Decheng Real Estate
Company Limited (Shanghai Higher People’s Court (2005) hu gao min si (shang) chu zi No. 1).
Shanghai Decheng Real Estate Three 2006: Pinghai Development Company Limited v.
Shanghai Municipal Pan-Asia Law Firm and Zhongxing Group Zhencheng Real Estate
Company Limited re: Shanghai Decheng Real Estate Company Limited (Shanghai No.1
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Intermediate People’s Court (2005) hu yi zhong min wu (shang) chu zi No. 122; on appeal
Shanghai Higher People’s Court (2006) hu gao min si zi No. 58).
Shanghai Kouweier Clothing 2008: Jiang Wenhong v. Wu Jinhui & Suzhou Jiaci Clothing and
Accessories Company Limited re: Shanghai Kouweier Clothing and Accessories Company
Limited (Shanghai No. 2 Intermediate People’s Court (2008) hue r zhong minwu (shang) chuzi
No. 21).
Shanghai Lujiazui Real Estate 2005: Shanghai Yaoguo Energy Science and Technology
Company Limited v. Gao Baoquan re: Shanghai Lujiazui United Real Estate Company Limited
(Shanghai No. 1 Intermediate People’s Court (2005) hu yi zhong min san (shang) chuzi No. 26;
on appeal Shanghai Higher People’s Court (2005) hu gao min er (shang) zhongzi No. 188).
Shanghai Ninghui 2008:
kai Kabushiki Gaisha 110 v. Yao Renjun, Shanghai Municipal
Fengxian Laofang Products Factory, and Shanghai Fengxian District Nanqiao Township
Agricultural Commercial Cooperative (Shanghai No. 1 Intermediate People’s Court (2008) hu yi
zhong min wu (shang) chu zi No. 181).
Shanghai No. 1 Diangqi 2009: Lin X v. Zhang Y re: Shanghai XXX Electric Company Limited
(Shanghai Minhang District People’s Court (2009)).
Shanghai Peieryou 2006: Wang Bin v. Wang Yuanquan and Beijing Peieryou Technology
Company Limited re: Shanghai Peieryou Technology Company Limited (unidentified Shanghai
District People’s Court; on appeal Shanghai No. 1 Intermediate People’s Court (after 2006).
Shanghai Shixing Real Estate 2005: Zhang Xinlong v. Lu Yiming re: Shanghai Shixing Real
Estate Development Operations Company Limited (Shanghai No. 2 Intermediate People’s Court
(2005) hu er zhong minsan (shang) chuzi No. 403).
Shanghai Taiwu Real Estate 2008: Zhang Junran v. Zhang Jianwei and Xie X. re: Shanghai
Taiwu Real Estate Consulting Company Limited (Shanghai Jiading District People’s Court
(2007) jia min er (shang) chu zi No. 944; on appeal Shanghai No. 2 Intermediate People’s Court
(2008) er zhong min san (shang) zi No. 93).
Shanghai Tianguang Medical 2009: Shanghai Jiaotong University Hospital Associated Ruijin
Hospital v. Huatong Tianxiang Group Co., Ltd. re: Shanghai Tianguang Biology Medical
Technology Company Limited (Shanghai No. 1 Intermediate People’s Court (2008) hui yi zhong
110

Apparently a Japanese CLS-type company.
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min san (shang) chu zi No. 4; on appeal Shanghai Higher People’s Court (2009) hu gao min er
(shang) zhong zi No. 18).
Shanghai Yanzhong Water Company 1996-7: Described in Deng (2005), pp. 366-7.*
Shanghai Yuanji International 2006: (U.S.A.) Enbi Group Yuanji Yanghang v. Shanghai
Cooperative Investment Company Limited and Zhou Zuyuan re: Shanghai Yuanji International
Trade Company Limited (Shanghai No. 2 Intermediate People’s Court (2006) hu er zhong min
wu (shang) chu zi No. 2).
Shanghai Zhongjian Enterprise 2008: Dong Fengchang v. Fang Yishu re: Shanghai
Zhongjian Enterprise Company Limited (Shanghai Hongkou District People’s Court, No. 2 Civil
Division, case filed September 26, 2008), case opinion not reviewed, but report by Judge Luo
Jianhao of the Hongkou District People’s Court, February 26, 2009.
Shizaishan Hengyuan 2009: Zhu Yongjun and 20 other shareholder plaintiffs v. Liu Huanren,
Zhu Yongjun and Ma Zhonghua re: Shizaishan Municipal Hengyuan Metals Collection Company
Limited (Shaizaishan Municipal Wukou District People’s Court (2008) shi da min zhu zi No.
1008; on appeal Ningxia Hui Minority Autonomous Region Shizaishan Municipal Intermediate
People’s Court (2009) shi min zhong zi No. 25).
Shunde Zhaoyu Electronic Hardware 2007: Zhao Yu v. Zhou Yuchao re: Shunde Municipal
Zhaoyu Electronic Hardware Company Limited (Guangdong Province Foshan Municipal Shunde
District People’s Court (2006) shun fa miner chuzi No. 02196; on appeal Guangdong Province
Foshan Intermediate People’s Court (2007) fo zhong fa miner zhongzi No. 348).
Tonghe Investment 2009: Zhejiang Hexin Electric Power Development Company Limited &
Jinhua City Daxing Materials Company Limited v. Tonghe Zhiye Investment Company Limited
re: Tonghe Investment Holding Company Limited (Zhejiang Higher People’s Court and Supreme
People’s Court, 2009).
Unknown Beijing Parties 2001: Reproduced in Beijing No. 1 Intermediate People’s Court
(2005), pp. 359-370; translated at Howson (2008), pp. 237-242.*
Weihai Yinghai 2008: Qingdao Municipal Chemical Petroleum Supply Company Limited v.
Zhang Chun re: Weihai Yinghai Zhiye Development Company Limited (Weihai Municipal
Intermediate People’s Court (2007) wei min er wai chu zi No. 27; on appeal Shandong Provincial
Higher People’s Court (2008) lu min si zhong zi No. 103).
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Xiamen Xinda 1997: Reported in Xie & Chen (2001), p. 24.*
Zhangjiagang Fiber Company 1994: Described in Supreme People’s Court (1994).*
Zhejiang Golden Bridge CLS 2003: Shen Guantong, Yang Yongxin, Ni Ahmao and Lu Zhuqin
representing 165 other shareholders v. Shaoxing County Materials General Company Assets
Liquidation Small Group re: Zhejiang Golden Bridge Co., Ltd. and Shaoxing County People’s
Government (Zhejiang Province Shaoxing Municipal Intermediate People’s Court (2003) shao
zhong min er chu zi No. 253..
Zhejiang Wu Fang Zhai 2001: Described in Luo (2004), pp. 335-6; Lu (2001); and Anon
(2001).*
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Appendix II: Relevant statutory provisions
Company Law, Article 152
Where a director or senior manager is in the circumstances specified in Article 150 of this
Law, 111 the shareholders of a limited liability company (“LLC”), or the shareholders of a
company limited by shares (“CLS”) individually or jointly holding one percent or more of its
shares for 180 or more consecutive days, may request in writing that the supervisory board, or
the supervisor(s) of an LLC where there is no such board, bring a lawsuit to a People’s Court;
and where a supervisor is in the circumstances specified in Article 150 of this Law, 112 the
aforementioned shareholders may request in writing that the board of directors, or the executive
director of an LLC where there is no board, bring a lawsuit to a People’s Court.
Where the supervisory board, the supervisor(s) of an LLC where no supervisory board is
established, the board of directors, or the executive director refuses to bring a lawsuit after
receiving the written request from the shareholders as specified in the preceding paragraph, or
fails to bring a lawsuit within 30 days from the date it receives such request, or in an emergency
situation where failure to bring a lawsuit immediately could result in damage to the interests of
the company that is difficult to remedy, the shareholders specified in the preceding paragraph
shall have the right, in their own names, to bring a lawsuit directly to a People’s Court in the
interest of the company.
Where others infringe upon the lawful rights and interests of a company and thereby cause losses
to the company, the shareholders specified in the first paragraph of this article may bring a
lawsuit to a People’s Court in accordance with the provisions of the preceding two paragraphs.
Related Statutory Provisions
Company Law, Article 20
The shareholders of a company shall observe laws, administrative regulations, and the
company’s articles of association and exercise the rights of a shareholder in accordance with law.
They shall not abuse their shareholders’ rights to damage the interests of the company . . . .
Where the shareholder of a company abuses shareholder rights and thus causes losses to the
company . . . , it shall be liable for compensation according to law.
Company Law, Article 54(6)
The supervisory board and the supervisor(s) of a company which has not established a
supervisory board shall exercise the following functions: . . .
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Company Law, Article 150, describes situations where such persons cause losses to the

company.
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Company Law, Article 150, describes situations where such persons cause losses to the

company.
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(6) to bring a lawsuit against directors or senior managers in accordance with the provisions of
Article 152 of this Law.
Company Law, Article 148
Directors, supervisors and senior managers shall observe laws, administrative regulations, and
the company’s articles of association, and have the duties of loyalty and care to the company.
Company Law, Article 150
Directors, supervisors or senior managers who violate law, administrative regulation or the
company’s articles of association in the performance of their duties for the company, and cause
losses for the company, shall be liable for compensation.
Other Normative Materials
Supreme People’s Court, Zuigao Renmin Fayuan guanyu shiyong “Zhonghua Renmin
Gongheguo Gongsi Fa” ruogan wenti de guiding (1) (Provisions of the Supreme People's
Court about Several Issues Concerning the Application of the Company Law of the
People's Republic of China (1)), effective May 9, 2006
Article 1: With respect to civil cases not yet completed and newly accepted by courts on or after
the date of implementation of the Company Law, where the civil act or event occurred prior to
that date, laws, regulations, and judicial interpretations from the period in question shall be
applied.
Article 2: Where someone brings a lawsuit on the grounds of a civil act or event that occurred
before the date of implementation of the Company Law, and there is no clear governing
provision in the laws, regulations, and judicial interpretations of the period in question, the
relevant provisions of the Company Law may be applied by reference.
Article 4: The holding period of 180 days or more stipulated in Article 152 of the Company Law
means the period of holding fulfilled at the time the shareholder brings the suit. The rule
stipulating aggregate holdings of at least one percent of the shares refers to the aggregate
holdings of two or more shareholders.
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